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Abstract. We present simpler and improved constructions of unbounded attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes
with constant-size public parameters under static assumptions in bilinear groups. Concretely, we obtain:
– a simple and adaptively secure unbounded ABE scheme in composite-order groups, improving upon a previous
construction of Lewko and Waters (Eurocrypt ’11) which only achieves selective security;
– an improved adaptively secure unbounded ABE scheme based on the k-linear assumption in prime-order
groups with shorter ciphertexts and secret keys than those of Okamoto and Takashima (Asiacrypt ’12);
– the first adaptively secure unbounded ABE scheme for arithmetic branching programs under static assump-
tions.
At the core of all of these constructions is a “bilinear entropy expansion” lemma that allows us to generate any
polynomial amount of entropy starting from constant-size public parameters; the entropy can then be used to
transform existing adaptively secure “bounded” ABE schemes into unbounded ones.
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1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [25, 13] is a generalization of public-key encryption to support fine-
grained access control for encrypted data. Here, ciphertexts and keys are associated with descriptive
values which determine whether decryption is possible. In a key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme for instance,
ciphertexts are associated with attributes like ‘(author:Waters), (inst:UT), (topic:PK)’ and keys with access
policies like ‘((topic:MPC) OR (topic:Qu)) AND (NOT(inst:CWI))’, and decryption is possible only when the
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attributes satisfy the access policy. A ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) scheme is the dual of KP-ABE with
ciphertexts associated with policies and keys with attributes.
Over past decade, substantial progress has been made in the design and analysis of ABE schemes,
leading to a large families of schemes that achieve various trade-offs between efficiency, security and
underlying assumptions. Meanwhile, ABE has found use as a tool for providing and enhancing privacy in
a variety of settings from electronic medical records to messaging systems and online social networks.
As institutions grow and with new emerging and more complex applications for ABE, it became clear
that we need ABE schemes that can readily accommodate the addition of new roles, entities, attributes and
policies. This means that the ABE set-up algorithm should put no restriction on the length of the attributes
or the size of the policies that will be used in the ciphertexts and keys. This requirement was introduced and
first realized in the work of Lewko and Waters [21] under the term unbounded ABE. Their constructions have
since been improved and extended in several subsequent works [18, 23, 24, 2, 17, 3, 5, 12, 1] (cf. Fig 1, 2).
In this work, we put forth new ABE schemes that simultaneously:
(1) are unbounded (the set-up algorithm is independent of the length of the attributes or the size of the
policies);
(2) can be based on faster asymmetric prime-order bilinear groups;
(3) achieve adaptive security;
(4) rely on simple hardness assumptions in the standard model.
All four properties are highly desirable from both a practical and theoretical stand-point and moreover,
properties (1) – (3) are crucial for many real-world applications of ABE. Indeed, properties (2), (3) and
(4) are by now standard cryptographic requirements pertaining to speed and efficiency, strong security
guarantees under realistic and natural attack models, and minimal hardness assumptions. Property (2) is
additionally motivated by the fact that pairing-based schemes are currently more widely implemented and
deployed than lattice-based ones. There is now a vast body of works (e.g. [19, 22, 27, 2, 6, 3]) showing how to
achieve properties (2) – (4) for “bounded” ABE where the set-up time and public parameters grow with the
attributes or policies, culminating in unifying frameworks that provide a solid understanding of the design
and analysis of these schemes. Unbounded ABE, on the other hand, has received comparatively much less
attention in the literature; this is in part because the schemes and proofs remain fairly complex and delicate.
Amongst these latter works, only the work of Okamato and Takashima (OT) [23] simultaneously achieved
(1) – (4).
Our results. We present simpler and more modular constructions of unbounded ABE that realize properties
(1) – (4) with better efficiency and expressiveness than was previously known.
(i) We present new adaptively secure, unbounded KP-ABE schemes for monotone span programs –which
capture access policies computable by monotone Boolean formulas– whose ciphertexts are 42% smaller
and our keys are 8% smaller than the state-of-the-art in [23] (with even more substantial savings with
our SXDH-based scheme), as well as CP-ABE schemes with similar savings, cf. Fig 3.
(ii) Our constructions generalize to the larger class of arithmetic span programs [15], which capture many
natural computational models, such as monotone Boolean formulas, as well as Boolean and arithmetic
branching programs; this yields the first adaptively secure, unbounded KP-ABE for arithmetic span
programs. Prior to this work, we do not even know any selectively secure, unbounded KP-ABE for
arithmetic span programs.
Moreover, our constructions generalize readily to the k-Lin assumption.
At the core of all of these constructions is a “bilinear entropy expansion” lemma [17] that allows us to
generate any polynomial amount of entropy starting from constant-size public parameters; the entropy can
then be used to transform existing adaptively secure bounded ABE schemes into unbounded ones in a single
shot. The fact that we only need to invoke our entropy expansion lemma once yields both quantitative and
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reference adaptive assumption standard model
OT12 [23] X 2-Lin X
RW13 [24] q-type X
Att16 [3] X q-type + k-Lin X
AC17 [1] X k-Lin, k ≥ 2
ours X k-Lin, k ≥ 1X X
Fig. 1. Summary of unbounded KP-ABE schemes for monotone
span programs from prime-order groups with O(1)-size mpk.
reference |mpk| adaptive assumption
LW11 [21] O(1)X staticX
Att14 [2] O(1)X X q-type
KL15 [17] O(logn) X staticX
ours O(1)X X staticX
Fig. 2. Summary of unbounded KP-ABE schemes for
monotone span programs with n-bit attributes (i.e.
universe [n]) from composite-order groups.
reference |mpk| |sk| |ct| assumption
KP-ABE OT12 [23] 79|G1|+|GT | 14n+5 14n+5 DLIN
Ours 9|G1|+|GT | 8n 5n+3 SXDH
28|G1|+2|GT | 13n 8n+5 DLIN
(5k2+4k)|G1|+k|GT | (5k+3)n (3k+2)n+2k+1 k-LIN
CP-ABE OT12 [23] 79|G1|+|GT | 14n+5 14n+5 DLIN
Ours 11|G1|+|GT | 5n+5 7n+3 SXDH
32|G1|+2|GT | 9n+9 12n+6 DLIN
(7k2+4)|G1|+k|GT | (4k+1)(n+1) (5k+2)n+3k k-LIN
Fig. 3. Summary of adaptively secure, unbounded ABE schemes for read-once monotone span programs with n-bit attributes (i.e.
universe [n]) from prime-order groups. The columns |sk| and |ct| refer to the number of group elements in G2 and G1 respectively
(minus a |GT | contribution in ct).
qualitative advantages over prior works [23, 17]: (i) we achieve security loss O(n+Q) for n-bit attributes (i.e.
universe [n]) and Q secret key queries, improving upon O(n ·Q) in [23] and O(logn ·Q) in [17] and (ii) there
is clear delineation between entropy expansion and the analysis of the underlying bounded ABE schemes,
whereas prior works interweave both techniques in a more complex nested manner.
Following the recent literature on adaptively secure bounded ABE, we first describe our constructions
in the simpler setting of composite-order bilinear groups, and then derive our final prime-order schemes
by building upon and extending previous frameworks in [6, 11, 7]. Along the way, we also present a
simple adaptively secure unbounded KP-ABE scheme in composite-order groups whose hardness relies on
standard, static assumptions (cf. Fig 2).
1.1 Technical overview
We will start with asymmetric composite-order bilinear groups (GN , HN ,GT ) whose order N is the product
of three primes p1, p2, p3. Let gi ,hi denote generators of order pi in GN and HN , for i = 1,2,3.
Warm-up. We begin with the LOSTW KP-ABE for monotone span programs [19]; this is a bounded,
adaptively secure scheme that uses composite-order groups. Here, ciphertexts ctx are associated with
attribute vector5 x ∈ {0,1}n and keys skM with read-once monotone span programs M.6
mpk := (g1, g v11 , . . . , g vn1 ,e(g1,h1)α) (1)
5 Some works associate ciphertexts with a set S ⊆ [n] where [n] is referred to as the attribute universe, in which case x ∈ {0,1}n
corresponds to the characteristic vector of S.
6 All known adaptively secure ABE for monotone span programs under static assumptions in the standard model (even in the
bounded setting and even with composite-order groups) have a read-once restriction [19, 22, 27, 2, 6, 3].
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ctx := (g s1, {g
sv j
1 }x j=1,e(g1,h1)
αs ·m)
skM := ({hα j+r j v j1 ,h
r j
1 } j∈[n])
whereα1, . . . ,αn are shares ofαw.r.t. the span program M; the shares satisfy the requirement that for any x ∈
{0,1}n , the shares {α j }x j=1 determineα if x satisfies M, and reveal nothing aboutα otherwise. For decryption,
observe that we can compute {e(g1,h1)α j s}x j=1, from which we can compute the blinding factor e(g1,h1)αs .
The proof of security relies on Waters’ dual system encryption methodology [26, 20, 27, 2], in the most basic
setting at the core of which is an information-theoretic statement about α j , v j .
Towards our unbounded ABE. The main challenge in building an unbounded ABE lies in “compressing”
g v11 , . . . , g
vn
1 in mpk down to a constant number of group elements. The first idea following [21, 23] is to
generate {v j } j∈[n] via a pairwise-independent hash function as w0 + j ·w1, as in the Lewko-Waters IBE.
Simply replacing v j with w0 + j ·w1 leads to natural malleability attacks on the ciphertext, and instead,
we would replace sv j with s j (w0 + j · w1), where s1, . . . , sn are fresh randomness used in encryption.
Next, we need to bind the s j (w0 + j ·w1)’s together via some common randomness s; it suffices to use
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1) in the ciphertext. That is, we start with the scheme in (1) and we perform the substitutions
(*) for each j ∈ [n]:
ciphertext: (s, sv j ) 7→ (s, sw + s j (w0+ j ·w1), s j )
secret key: (α j + v j r j ,r j ) 7→ (α j + r j w,r j ,r j (w0+ j ·w1))
(*)
This yields the following scheme:
mpk := (g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 ,e(g1,h1)α) (2)
ctx := (g s1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 }x j=1,e(g1,h1)
αs ·m)
skM := ({hα j+r j w1 ,h
r j
1 ,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n])
As a sanity check for decryption, observe that we can compute {e(g1,h1)α j s}x j=1 and then e(g1,h1)αs as
before. We note that the ensuing scheme is similar to Attrapadung’s unbounded KP-ABE in [2, Section 7.1],
except the latter requires q-type assumptions.7
Our proof strategy. To analyze our scheme in (2), we follow a very simple and natural proof strategy: we
would “undo” the substitutions described in (*) to recover ciphertext and keys similar to those in the LOSTW
KP-ABE, upon which we could apply the analysis for the bounded setting from the prior works. That is, we
want to computationally replace each w0+ j ·w1 with a fresh u j : g
s
1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
{h
α j+r j w
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
 hopefully≈c
 g
s
1, {g
sw+s j u j
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
{h
α j+r j w
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j u j
1 } j∈[n]
 (3)
Unfortunately, once we give out g w01 , g
w1
1 in mpk, the above distributions are trivially distinguishable by
using the relation e(g1,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ) = e(g
w0+ j ·w1
1 ,h
r j
1 ). Furthermore, the above statement does not yield a
scheme similar to LOSTW when applied to our scheme in (2); for that, we would need to also replace w on
the RHS in (3) with fresh v j as described by
(g
sw+s j u j
1 ,h
α j+r j w
1 ) 7→ (g
sv j+s j u j
1 ,h
α j+r j v j
1 )
in order to match up with the LOSTW KP-ABE in (1).
7 Attrapadung’s unbounded KP-ABE does have the advantage that there is no read-once restriction on the span programs, but
even with the read-once restriction, the proof still requires q-type assumptions.
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1.2 Bilinear entropy expansion
The core of our analysis is a (bilinear) entropy expansion lemma [17] that captures the spirit of the above
statement in (3), namely, it allows us to generate fresh independent randomness starting from the correlated
randomness, albeit in a new subgroup of order p2 generated by g2,h2.
More formally, given public parameters (g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 ,h1,h
w
1 ,h
w0
1 ,h
w1
1 ), we show that g
s
1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
{h
r j w
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
≈c — ·
 g
s
2, {g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
{h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
 (4)
where “—” is short-hand for duplicating the terms on the LHS, so that the g1,h1-components remain
unchanged. That is, starting with the LHS, we replaced (i) w0 + j ·w1 with fresh u j , and (ii) w with fresh
v j , both in the p2-subgroup. We also omitted theα j ’s from (3). We clarify that the trivial distinguisher on (3)
fails here because e(g1,h2)= 1.
Prior work. We clarify that the name “bilinear entropy expansion” was introduced in the prior work of
Kowalczyk and Lewko (KL) [17], which also proved a statement similar to (3), with three notable differences:
(i) our entropy expansion lemma starts with 3 units of entropy (w, w0, w1) whereas KL uses O(logn) units
of entropy; (ii) the KL statement does not account for the public parameters, and therefore (unlike our
lemma) cannot serve as an immediate bridge from the unbounded ABE to the bounded variant; (iii) our
entropy expansion lemma admits an analogue in prime-order groups, which in turn yields an unbounded
ABE scheme in prime-order groups, whereas the composite-order ABE scheme in KL does not have an
analogue in prime-order setting (an earlier prime-order construction was retracted on June 1, 2016). In fact,
the “consistent randomness amplification” techniques used in the unbounded ABE schemes of Okamoto
and Takashima (OT) [23] also seem to yield an entropy expansion lemma with O(1) units of entropy in
prime-order groups. As noted earlier in the introduction, our approach is also different from both KL and
OT in the sense that we only need to invoke our entropy expansion lemma once when proving security of
the unbounded ABE.
Proof overview. We provide a proof overview of our entropy expansion lemma in (4). The proof proceeds in
two steps: (i) replacing w0+ j ·w1 with fresh u j , and then (ii) replacing w with fresh v j .
(i) We replace w0+ j ·w1 with fresh u j ; that is, {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
{h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n],
≈c — ·
 {g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
{h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
 (5)
where we suppressed the terms involving w ; moreover, this holds even given g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 . Our first
observation is that we can easily adapt the proof of Lewko-Waters IBE [20, 8] to show that for each i ∈ [n], g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 , g
si
1
{h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j 6=i
≈c — ·
 g
si ui
2 , g
si
2
{h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j 6=i
 (6)
The idea is that the first term on the LHS corresponds to an encryption for the identity i , and the next
n−1 terms correspond to secret keys for identities j 6= i ; on the right, we have the corresponding “semi-
functional entities”. At this point, we can easily handle (hri2 ,h
ri (w0+i ·w1)
2 ) via a statistical argument, thanks
to the entropy in w0+ i ·w1 mod p2. Next, we need to get from a single (g si (w0+i ·w1)1 , g si1 ) on the LHS in
(6) to n such terms on the LHS in (5). This requires a delicate “two slot” hybrid argument over i ∈ [n] and
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the use of an additional subgroup; similar arguments also appeared in [23, 14]. This is where we used the
fact that N is a product of three primes, whereas the Lewko-Waters IBE and the statement in (6) works
with two primes in the asymmetric setting.
(ii) Next, we replace w with fresh v j ; that is, g
s
2, {g
sw+s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
{h
r j w
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
≈c
 g
s
2, {g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
{h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

Intuitively, this should follow from the DDH assumption in the p2-subgroup, which says that (h
r j w
2 ,h
r j
2 )≈c
(h
r j v j
2 ,h
r j
2 ). The actual proof is more delicate since w also appears on the other side of the pairing as
g
sw+s j u j
2 ; fortunately, we can treat u j as a one-time pad that masks w .
Completing the proof of unbounded ABE. We return to a proof sketch of our unbounded ABE in (2). Let us
start with the simpler setting where the adversary makes only a single key query. Upon applying our entropy
expansion lemma8, we have that the ciphertext/key pair (ctx,skM) satisfies g
s
1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 }x j=1
{h
α j+r j w
1 ,h
r j
1 ,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
≈c — ·
 g
s
2, {g
sv j+s j u j
1 , g
s j
2 }x j=1
{h
α j+r j v j
2 ,h
r j
2 ,h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

with e(g1,h1)αs ·m omitted. Note that the boxed term on the RHS is exactly the LOSTW KP-ABE ciphertex-
t/key pair in (1) over the p2-subgroup, once we strip away the terms involving u j , s j .
Finally, to handle the general setting where the ABE adversary makes Q key queries, we simply observe
that thanks to self-reducibility, our entropy expansion lemma extends to a Q-fold setting (with Q copies of
{r j } j∈[n]) without any additional security loss: g
s
1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
{h
r j ,κw
1 , h
r j ,κ
1 , h
r j ,κ(w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n],κ∈[Q]
≈c — ·
 g
s
2, {g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
{h
r j ,κv j
2 , h
r j ,κ
2 , h
r j ,κu j
2 } j∈[n],κ∈[Q]

At this point, we can rely on the (adaptive) security for the LOSTW KP-ABE for the setting with a single
challenge ciphertext and Q key queries.
1.3 Our prime-order scheme
To obtain prime-order analogues of our composite-order schemes, we build upon and extend the previous
framework of Chen et al. [6, 11] for simulating composite-order groups in prime-order ones. Along the way,
we present a more general framework that provides prime-order analogues of the static assumptions used
in the security proof for our composite-order ABE. Moreover, we show that these prime-order analogues
follow from the standard k-Linear assumption (and more generally, the MDDH assumption [9]) in prime-
order bilinear groups.
Our KP-ABE. Let (G1,G2,GT ) be a bilinear group of prime order p. Following [6, 11], we start with our
composite-order KP-ABE scheme in (2), sample A1 ←R Z(2k+1)×kp ,B←R Z(k+1)×kp , and carry out the following
8 and a subgroup assumption to introduce the h
α j
2 ’s.
6
substitutions:
g1 7→ [A1]1, h1 7→ [B]2
α 7→ k ∈Z2k+1p w, w0, w1 7→W,W0,W1 ∈Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p
s, s j 7→ s,s j ∈Zkp , r j 7→ r j ∈Zkp
g s1 7→ [s>A>1 ]1, h
r j
1 7→ [Br j ]2
g w s1 7→ [s>A>1 W]1, h
wr j
1 7→ [WBr j ]2
(7)
where [·]1, [·]2 correspond respectively to exponentiations in the prime-order groups G1,G2. This yields the
following prime-order KP-ABE scheme for monotone span programs:
mpk := ( [A>1 ]1, [A>1 W]1, [A>1 W0]1, [A>1 W1]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ),
ctx := ( [s>A>1 ]1, {[s>A>1 W+s>j A>1 (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [s>j A>1 ]1}x j=1,e([s>A>1 ]1, [k]2) ·m )
skM := ( {[k j +WBr j ]2, [Br j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)Br j ]2} j∈[n] )
where k j is the j ’th share of k. Decryption proceeds as before by first computing {e([s>A>1 ]1, [k j ]2)}x j=1 and
relies on the associativity relations A>1 W ·B=A>1 ·WB (ditto W0+ j ·W1) [7].
Dimensions of A1, B. It is helpful to compare the dimensions of A1,B to those of the CGW prime-order
analogue of LOSTW in [6]; once we fix the dimensions of A1,B, the dimensions of W,W0,W1 are also fixed. In
all of these constructions, the width of A1,B is always k, for constructions based on the k-linear assumption.
CGW uses a shorter A1 of dimensions (k + 1)× k, and a B of the same dimensions (k + 1)× k. Roughly
speaking, increasing the height of A1 by k plays the role of adding a subgroup in our composite-order
scheme; in particular, the LOSTW KP-ABE uses a group of order p1p2 in the asymmetric setting, whereas
our unbounded ABE uses a group of order p1p2p3.
We note that the direct adaptation of the prior techniques in [11] would yield A1 of height 3k and B
of height k + 1, and reducing the height of A1 down to 2k + 1 is the key to our efficiency improvements
over the prime-order unbounded KP-ABE scheme in [23]. To accomplish this, we need to optimize on the
static assumptions used in the composite-order bilinear entropy expansion lemma, and thereafter, carefully
transfer these optimizations to the prime-order setting, building upon and extending the recent prime-
order IBE schemes in [11].
Bilinear entropy expansion lemma. In the rest of this overview, we motivate the prime-order analogue of
our bilinear entropy expansion lemma in (4), and defer a more accurate treatment to Section 5. Upon our
substitutions in (7), we expect to prove a statement of the form: [s
>A>1 ]1, {[s
>A>1 W+s>j A>1 (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [s>j A>1 ]1} j∈[n]
{[WBr j ]2, [Br j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)Br j ]2} j∈[n]
 (8)
roughly≈c — ·
 [sˆ
>A>2 ]1, {[sˆ
>A>2 V j + sˆ>j A>2 U j ]1, [sˆ>j A>2 ]1} j∈[n]
{[V j Br j ]2, [0]2, [U j Br j ]2} j∈[n]

given also the public parameters [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1. Here, A2 ←R Z(2k+1)×kp is an additional
matrix that plays the role of g2, whereas U j ,V j play the roles of the fresh entropy u j , v j . Note that we do
not introduce additional terms that correspond to those involving h2 on the RHS, and can therefore keep
B of dimensions (k + 1)× k. To prevent a trivial distinguishing attack based on the associativity relation
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A>1 W ·B = A>1 ·WB, we need to sample random U j ,V j subject to the constraints A>1 U j = A>1 V j = 0. In the
proof of the entropy expansion lemma, we will show that the k-Lin assumption implies
(A1,A
>
1 W, {[WBr j ]2, [Br j ]2} j∈[n])≈c (A1,A>1 W, {[(W+ U j )Br j ]2, [Br j ]2} j∈[n]).
To complete the proof of the unbounded ABE, we proceed as before in the composite-order setting, and
observe that the boxed term in (8) above (once we strip away the terms involving U j and sˆ j ) correspond to
the prime-order variant of the LOSTW KP-ABE in CGW, as given by:
ctx := ( [sˆ>A>2 ]1, {[sˆ>A>2 V j ]1}x j=1,e([sˆ>A>2 ]1, [k]2) ·m )
skM := ( {[k j +V j Br j ]2, [Br j ]2} j∈[n] )
As in the composite-order setting, we need to first extend our bilinear entropy expansion lemma to a Q-fold
setting via random self-reducibility. We may then carry out the analysis in CGW to complete the proof of our
unbounded ABE.
1.4 Extensions
We briefly sketch two extensions: CP-ABE for monotone span programs, and KP-ABE for arithmetic span
programs.
CP-ABE. Here, we start with the LOSTW CP-ABE for monotone span programs [19], which basically reverses
the structures of the ciphertexts and keys. This means that we will need a variant of our entropy expansion
lemma that accommodates a similar reversal. The statement adapts naturally to this setting, and so does
the proof, except we need to make some changes to step two, which requires that we start with a taller
A1 ∈Z3k×kq . This gives rise to the following prime-order CP-ABE:
mpk := ( [A>1 ]1, [A>1 W]1, [A>1 W0]1, [A>1 W1]1, [A>1 U0]1 e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ),
ctM := ( [s>A>1 ]1, { [c>0, j +s>j A>1 W]1, [s>j A>1 ]1, [s>j A>1 (W0+ j ·W1)]1 } j∈[n],e([s>A>1 ]1, [k]2) ·m )
skx := ( [k+U0Br]2, [Br]2, { [WBr+ (W0+ j ·W1)Br j ]2, [Br j ]2 }x j=1 )
where c0, j is the j ’th share of c0 := s>A>1 U0 w.r.t. M. Decryption proceeds by first computing {e([c>0, j ]1, [Br]2)}x j=1
and then e([c>0 ]1, [Br]2).
Arithmetic span programs. In arithmetic span programs, the attributes x come from Znp instead of {0,1}
n ,
which enable richer and more expressive arithmetic computation. The analogue of the LOSTW KP-ABE for
arithmetic span programs [6, 15] will then have ciphertexts:
ctx := (g s1, {g
(v j+x j v ′j )s
1 } j∈[n],e(g1,h1)
αs ·m).
That is, we replaced g
x j v j s
1 in (1) with g
(v j+x j v ′j )s
1 . In the unbounded setting, we will need to generate {v j } j∈[n]
and {v ′j } j∈[n] via two different pairwise-independent hash functions, given by w0 + j w1 and w ′0 + j w ′1
respectively. Our entropy expansion lemma generalizes naturally to this setting.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by s ←R S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S. By
PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Throughout this paper, we use 1λ as the
security parameter. We use lower case boldface to denote (column) vectors and upper case boldcase to
denote matrices. We use ≡ to denote two distributions being identically distributed, and ≈c to denote two
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distributions being computationally indistinguishable. For any two finite sets (also including spaces and
groups) S1 and S2, the notation “S1 ≈c S2” means the uniform distributions over them are computationally
indistinguishable.
2.1 Monotone span programs
We define (monotone) span programs [16].
Definition 1 (span programs [4, 16]). A (monotone) span program for attribute universe [n] is a pair (M,ρ)
where M is a `×`′ matrix over Zp and ρ : [`]→ [n]. Given x= (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n , we say that
x satisfies (M,ρ) iff 1 ∈ span〈Mx〉,
Here, 1 := (1,0, . . . ,0)> ∈ Z1×`′ is a row vector; Mx denotes the collection of vectors {M j : xρ( j ) = 1} where M j
denotes the j ’th row of M; and span refers to linear span of collection of (row) vectors over Zp .
That is, x satisfies (M,ρ) iff there exists constants ω1, . . . ,ω` ∈Zp such that∑
j :xρ( j )=1
ω j M j = 1 (9)
Observe that the constants {ω j } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M via Gaussian
elimination. Like in [19, 6], we need to impose a one-use restriction, that is, ρ is a permutation and ` = n.
By re-ordering the rows of M, we may assume WLOG that ρ is the identity map, which we omit in the rest of
this section.
Lemma 1 (statistical lemma [6, Appendix A.6]). For any x that does not satisfy M, the distributions
({v j } j :x j=1, {M j
(
α
u
)+ r j v j , r j } j∈[n])
perfectly hide α, where the randomness is taken over v j ←R Zp ,u←R Z`′−1p , and for any fixed r j 6= 0.
2.2 Attribute-based encryption
An attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for a predicate P( · , · ) consists of four algorithms (Setup,Enc,
KeyGen,Dec):
Setup(1λ,X,Y,M)→ (mpk,msk). The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter λ, the attribute
universeX, the predicate universe Y, the message spaceM and outputs the public parameter mpk, and
the master key msk.
Enc(mpk, x,m)→ ctx . The encryption algorithm gets as input mpk, an attribute x ∈X and a message m ∈
M. It outputs a ciphertext ctx . Note that x is public given ctx .
KeyGen(mpk,msk, y)→ sky . The key generation algorithm gets as input msk and a value y ∈ Y. It outputs a
secret key sky . Note that y is public given sky .
Dec(mpk,sky ,ctx )→m. The decryption algorithm gets as input sky and ctx such that P(x, y)= 1. It outputs
a message m.
Correctness. We require that for all (x, y) ∈X×Y such that P(x, y)= 1 and all m ∈M,
Pr[Dec(mpk,sky ,Enc(mpk, x,m))=m]= 1,
where the probability is taken over (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ,X,Y,M), sky ← KeyGen(mpk,msk, y), and the
coins of Enc.
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Security definition. For a stateful adversaryA, we define the advantage function
AdvABEA (λ) := Pr
b = b
′ :
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ,X,Y,M);
(x∗,m0,m1)←AKeyGen(msk,·)(mpk);
b ←R {0,1};ctx∗ ←Enc(mpk, x∗,mb);
b′←AKeyGen(msk,·)(ctx∗)
−
1
2
with the restriction that all queries y that A makes to KeyGen(msk, ·) satisfies P(x∗, y) = 0 (that is, sky does
not decrypt ctx∗). An ABE scheme is adaptively secure if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv
ABE
A (λ)
is a negligible function in λ.
Unbounded ABE. An ABE scheme is unbounded [21] if the running time of Setup only depends on λ;
otherwise, we say that it is bounded.
3 Bilinear Entropy Expansion, Revisited
In this section, we present our (bilinear) entropy expansion lemma in composite-order groups.
3.1 Composite-order bilinear groups and computational assumptions
A generator G takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs G := (GN , HN ,GT ,e), where N is product of
three primes p1, p2, p3 of Θ(λ) bits, GN , HN and GT are cyclic groups of order N and e : GN ×HN → GT
is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We require that the group operations in GN , HN and GT as well the
bilinear map e are computable in deterministic polynomial time with respect to λ. We assume that a
random generator g (resp. h) of GN (resp. HN ) is always contained in the description of bilinear groups.
For every divisor n of N , we denote by Gn the subgroup of GN of order n. We use g1, g2, g3 to denote
random generators of the subgroups Gp1 ,Gp2 ,Gp3 respectively. We define h1,h2,h3 random generators of
the subgroups Hp1 , Hp2 , Hp3 analogously.
Computational assumptions. We review two static computational assumptions in the composite-order
group, used e.g. in [20, 8].
Assumption 1 (SDGNp1 7→p1p2 ) We say that (p1 7→ p1p2)-subgroup decision assumption, denoted by SDGNp1 7→p1p2 ,
holds if for all PPT adversariesA, the following advantage function is negligible in λ.
Adv
SDGNp1 7→p1 p2
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(G,D,T0)= 1]−Pr[A(G,D,T1)= 1] |
where
D := (g1, g2, g3,h1,h3,h12), h12 ←R Hp1p2
T0 ←R Gp1 , T1 ←R Gp1p2 .
Assumption 2 (DDHHNp1 ) We say that p1-subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumption, denoted by DDH
HN
p1 , holds if
for all PPT adversariesA, the following advantage function is negligible in λ.
Adv
DDHHNp1
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(G,D,T0)= 1]−Pr[A(G,D,T1)= 1] |
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where
D := (g1, g2, g3,h1,h2,h3),
T0 := (hx1 ,h
y
1 , h
x y
1 ), T1 := (hx1 ,h
y
1 , h
x y+z
1 ), x, y, z ←R ZN .
By symmetry, one may permute the indices for subgroups and/or exchange the roles of GN and HN , and
define SDGNp1 7→p1p3 , SD
GN
p3 7→p3p2 , SD
HN
p1 7→p1p2 , SD
HN
p1 7→p1p3 and DDH
HN
p2 ,DDH
HN
p3 analogously.
3.2 Lemma in Composite-order groups
We state our entropy expansion lemma in composite-order groups as follows.
Lemma 2 (Bilinear entropy expansion lemma). Under the SDHNp1 7→p1p2 , SD
HN
p1 7→p1p3 , SD
GN
p1 7→p1p2 , DDH
HN
p2 ,
SDGNp1 7→p1p3 , DDH
HN
p3 , SD
GN
p3 7→p3p2 assumptions, we have
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 · h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
1 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

where
w, w0, w1 ←R ZN , v j ,u j ←R ZN , s, s j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN .
Concretely, the distinguishing advantage AdvEXPLEMA (λ) is at most
Adv
SDHNp1 7→p1 p2
B
(λ)+AdvSD
HN
p1 7→p1 p3
B′ (λ)+Adv
SDGNp1 7→p1 p2
B′′ (λ)+Adv
SDHNp1 7→p1 p3
B′′′ (λ)+Adv
DDHHNp2
B0
(λ)
+ n · (AdvSDGNp1 7→p1 p3
B1
(λ)+AdvDDH
HN
p3
B2
(λ)+AdvSD
GN
p3 7→p3 p2
B4
(λ)+AdvDDH
HN
p3
B6
(λ)+AdvSD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3
B7
(λ)
)+AdvDDHHNp2
B8
(λ)
where Time(B), Time(B′), Time(B′′), Time(B′′′), Time(B0), Time(B1), Time(B2), Time(B4), Time(B6),
Time(B7), Time(B8)≈Time(A).
We will prove the lemma in two steps via the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3 (Bilinear entropy expansion lemma (step one)). Under the DDHHNp2 , SD
GN
p1 7→p1p3 , DDH
HN
p3 , SD
GN
p3 7→p3p2
assumptions, we have
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
123, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

where
w0, w1 ←R ZN , u j ←R ZN , s j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN .
Concretely, the distinguishing advantage AdvSTEP1A (λ) is at most
Adv
DDHHNp2
B0
(λ)+n · (AdvSDGNp1 7→p1 p3
B1
(λ)+AdvDDH
HN
p3
B2
(λ)+AdvSD
GN
p3 7→p3 p2
B4
(λ)+AdvDDH
HN
p3
B6
(λ)+AdvSD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3
B7
(λ)
)
where Time(B0), Time(B1), Time(B2), Time(B4), Time(B6), Time(B7)≈Time(A).
Note that sk in the LHS of this lemma has an extra h23-component, which we may introduce using the
SDHNp1 7→p1p2 and SD
HN
p1 7→p1p3 assumption. The proof of this lemma is fairly involved, and we defer the proof to
Section 3.3.
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Lemma 4 (Bilinear entropy expansion lemma (step two)). Under the DDHHNp2 assumption, we have
aux : g1, g w1 ,h1,h
w
1
ct : g s2, { g
sw
2 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g w1 ,h1,h
w
1
ct : g s2, { g
sv j
2 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : { h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

where
w ←R ZN , v j ,u j ←R ZN , s, s j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN .
Concretely, the distinguishing advantage AdvSTEP2A (λ) is at most Adv
DDHHNp2
B8
(λ) where Time(B8)≈Time(A).
Proof. This follows from the DDHHNp2 assumption, which tells us that
{h
r j
2 ,h
r j w
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 , h
r j v j
2 } j∈[n].
The adversary B8 on input {h
r j
2 ,T j } j∈[n] along with g1, g2,h1,h2, samples w˜ , s, s j , u˜ j ←R ZN (and implicitly
sets u j = 1s j (u˜ j − sw)), then runsA on input
aux : g1, g w˜1 ,h1,h
w˜
1
ct : g s2, { g
u˜ j
2 , g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {T j , h
r j
2 , (h
r j
2 )
u˜ j
s j ·T
− ss j
j } j∈[n]
 .
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have (g w1 ,h
w
1 , g
w
2 ,h
w
2 )≡ (g w˜1 ,hw˜1 , g w2 ,hw2 ), where w, w˜ ←R ZN . Next,
observe that
– When T j = g r j w and if we write r j u j = r j · u˜ js j + r j w · (−
s
s j
), then u˜ j = sw + s j u j and the distribution we
feed toA is exactly that of the left distribution.
– When T j = g r j v j and if we write r j u j = r j · u˜ js j + r j v j · (−
s
s j
), then u˜ j = sv j + s j u j and the distribution we
feed toA is exactly that of the right distribution.
This completes the proof. uunionsq
We may now complete the proof of Lemma 2 using Lemmas 3 and 4.
Proof (of Lemma 2). The statement follows readily from the following hybrid argument:
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
 LHS in Lemma 2
p1 7→p1p2p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : { h123
r j w
, h123
r j
, h123
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
} j∈[n]

p1 7→p1p2≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
123 , h
r j
123, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 } j∈[n]

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Lemma 3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
13 · h
r j w
2 , h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

p1 7→p1p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : { h1
r j w ·hr j w2 , h1
r j ·hr j2 , h1
r j (w0+ j ·w1) ·hr j u j2 } j∈[n]

Lemma 4≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g sw1 · g
sv j
2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 · h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
 RHS in Lemma 2
It is direct to justify every transitions as follows:
– The first transition follows from
{h
r j
1 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
123} j∈[n] given g1
where h1 and h123 are random generators of Hp1 and HN , which is implied by the SD
HN
p1 7→p1p2 and
SDHNp1 7→p1p3 assumption. In the reduction, we sample w, w0, w1 ←R ZN and simulate aux,ct honestly.
– The second transition is ensured by the SDGNp1 7→p1p2 assumption which tells us that
g s1 ≈c g s1 · g s2 given g1
where g1 and g2 are random generators of Gp1 and Gp2 . In the reduction, we sample w, w0, w1 ←R ZN
and simulate aux and sk honestly.
– The third transition follows from Lemma 3. In the reduction, we sample w ←R ZN and simulate g w1 in aux
honestly. We then use generators g1 and g2 to simulate (g s1 · g s2, g sw1 · g sw2 ) in ct and use h
r j
123 (or h
r j
13 ·h
r j
2 )
to simulate h
r j w
123 in sk.
– The fourth transition follows from the SDHNp1 7→p1p3 assumption asserting
{h
r j
1 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
13} j∈[n] given g1, g2,h2
where h1 and h13 are random generators of Hp1 and Hp1p3 . In the reduction, we sample w, w0, w1 ←R ZN
and u j , v j ←R ZN , and simulate aux using g1 and ct from g1, g2.
– The final transition follows from Lemma 4. In the reduction, we sample w0, w1 ←R ZN and simulate
g w01 and g
w1
1 in aux honestly. By g1, g
w
1 ,h1,h
w
1 , we can simulate all g1-components in ct (i.e., g
s
1 and
{g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]) and all h1-components in sk (i.e., {h
r j w
1 ,h
r j
1 ,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]). uunionsq
3.3 Entropy expansion lemma: Step one
Proof overview. First, we note that we can adapt the proof of the Lewko-Waters IBE [20, 8]9 to show that
under SDGNp1 7→p1p3 and DDH
HN
p3 assumptions, we have that for each i ∈ [n]:
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : {g si (w0+i ·w1)1 , g
si
1 }
sk : {h
r j
13, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : {g si (w0+i ·w1)1 · g si ui3 , g si1 · g si3 }
sk : {h
r j
1 · h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n]
 .
9 with two main differences: (i) we are in the selective setting which allows for a much simpler proof, (ii) we allow j = i in sk.
13
We can then use the SDGNp3 7→p2p3 assumption to argue that
(g si3 , g
si ui
3 )≈c (g si3 · g si2 , g si ui3 · g si ui2 )
Roughly speaking, we will then repeat the above argument n times for each i ∈ [n] (see Sub-Gamei ,1 through
Sub-Gamei ,4 below). Here, there is an additional complication arising from the fact that in order to invoke
the SDGNp1 7→p1p3 assumption, we need to simulate sk given only h1,h13,h2. To do this, we need to switch sk
back to {h
r j
13,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 } j∈[n], which we do in Sub-Gamei ,5 through Sub-Gamei ,7.
At this point, we are almost done, except we still need to introduce a (h
r j
2 ,h
r j u j
2 )-component into sk.
We will handle this at the very beginning of the proof (cf. Game0′). Fortunately, we can carry out the above
argument even with the extra (h
r j
2 ,h
r j u j
2 )-component in sk.
Actual proof. We prove step one of the entropy expansion lemma in Lemma 3 via the following game
sequence, which is summarized in Fig 4. By ct j (resp. sk j ), we denote the j ’th tuple of ct (resp. sk).
Game0. This is the left distribution in Lemma 3:
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
123, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 } j∈[n]
 .
Game0′ . We modify sk as follows:
sk : {h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
where u1, . . . ,un ←R ZN . We claim that Game0 ≈c Game0′ . This follows from the DDHHNp2 assumption, which
tells us that
{h
r j
2 ,h
r j w0
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 , h
r j u′j
2 } j∈[n] given g1, g2,h13
where u′j ←R ZN and we will then implicitly set u j = u′j + j ·w1 for all j ∈ [n]. In the security reduction, we
use the fact that aux,ct leak no information about w0 mod p2. See Lemma 22 for details.
Gamei (i = 1, . . . ,n+1). We modify ct as follows:
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j<i
{g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j≥i
where u1, . . . ,ui−1 are defined as in Game0′ . It is easy to see that Game0′ ≡ Game1. To show that Gamei ≈c
Gamei+1, we will require another sequence of sub-games.
Sub-Gamei ,1. Identical to Gamei except that we modify cti as follows:
cti : {g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 · g si (w0+i ·w1)3 , g si1 · g si3 }
We claim that Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1. This follows from the SDGNp1 7→p1p3 assumption, which tells us that
g si1 ≈c g si1 · g si3 given g1, g2,h13,h2
In the reduction, we will sample w0, w1,u j ←R ZN and use g1, g2 to simulate aux, {ct j } j 6=i and h13,h2 to
simulate sk. See Lemma 23 for details.
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Sub-Gamei ,2. We modify the distribution of sk j for all j 6= i (while keeping ski unchanged):
sk j ( j 6= i ) : hr j1 ·h
r j
2 · h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 · h
r j u j
3
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2. This follows from the DDHHNp3 assumption, which tells us that
{h
r j
3 ,h
r j w1
3 } j 6=i ≈c {h
r j
3 , h
r j u′j
3 } j 6=i given g1, g2, g3,h1,h2,h3.
where u′j ←R ZN . In the reduction, we will program w0 := w˜0− i ·w1 mod p3 with w˜0 ←R ZN so that we can
simulate g si (w0+i ·w1)3 in cti , and then implicitly set u j = w˜0+ ( j − i ) ·u′j mod p3 for all j 6= i . See Lemma 24
for details.
Sub-Gamei ,3. We modify the distribution of cti and ski simultaneously:
cti : g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 · g si ui3 , g si1 · g si3
ski : h
ri
1 ·hri2 ·hri3 , hri (w0+i ·w1)1 ·hri ui2 · hri ui3
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,3. This follows from the fact that for all j 6= i , the quantity w0+ j ·
w1 mod p3 leaked in sk j is masked by u j and therefore {w0+ i ·w1 mod p3} ≡ {ui mod p3}. See Lemma 25
for details.
Sub-Gamei ,4. We modify the distribution of cti as follows:
cti : g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 · g si ui2 · g si ui3 , g si1 · g si2 · g si3
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,3 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,4. This follows from the SDGNp3 7→p3p2 assumption, which tells us that
g si3 ≈c g si2 · g si3 given g1, g2,h1,h23.
In the reduction, we will sample w0, w1,u j ←R ZN and use g1, g2 to simulate aux, {ct j } j 6=i . In addition, we
will use generator h23 to sample {h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 ,h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n] in sk. See Lemma 26 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,5. We modify the distribution of cti and ski :
cti : g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 · g si ui2 · g si (w0+i ·w1)3 , g si1 · g si2 · g si3
ski : h
ri
1 ·hri2 ·hri3 , hri (w0+i ·w1)1 ·hri ui2 · hri (w0+i ·w1)3
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,4 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,5. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡
Sub-Gamei ,3. See Lemma 27 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,6. We modify the distribution of sk j for all j 6= i :
sk j ( j 6= i ) : hr j1 ·h
r j
2 · h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 · h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,5 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,6. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c
Sub-Gamei ,2. See Lemma 28 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,7. We modify the distribution of cti :
cti : g
si (w0+i ·w1)
1 · g si ui2 ·

g si (w0+i ·w1)3 , g
si
1 · g si2 ·  g
si
3
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We claim that Sub-Gamei ,6 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,7. The proof is completely analogous to that of Gamei ≈c
Sub-Gamei ,1. See Lemma 29 for details. Furthermore, observe that Sub-Gamei ,7 is actually identical to
Gamei+1.
Gamen+1. In Gamen+1, we have:
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
 .
This is exactly the right distribution of Lemma 3.
Game CT j < i i j > i SK j 6= i i Remark & Aux
g
s j
1 · ? (h
r j
1 · h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 )
g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · ? h
r j (w0+ j w1)
1 · ?
0 1 Left distribution
1 h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
2 ·h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3
0′ 1 DDHHNp2 : {h
r j
2 ,h
r j w0
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 ,h
r j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]
1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3 define u j from u
′
j
i g
s j
2 1 1 Game1 =Game0′
g
s j u j
2 1 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3 Gamei−1,7 =Gamei
i ,1 g
s j
2 g
si
3 1 SD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3 : g
si
1 ≈c g si1 · g si3
g
s j u j
2 g
si (w0+i ·w1)
3 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3 given g1, g2,h13,h2
i ,2 g
s j
2 g
si
3 1 DDH
HN
p3 : {h
r j
3 ,h
r j w1
3 } j 6=i ≈c {h
r j
3 ,h
r j u
′
j
3 } j 6=i
g
s j u j
2 g
si (w0+i ·w1)
3 1 h
r j u j
2 · h
r j u j
3 h
ri ui
2 ·hri (w0+i ·w1)3 given w0+ i ·w1, define u j from u′j
i ,3 g
s j
2 g
si
3 1 statistical argument: for fixed {sk j ,ct j } j 6=i
g
s j u j
2 g
si ui
3 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j u j
3 h
ri ui
2 · hri ui3 {w0+ i ·w1 mod p3}≡ {ui mod p3}
i ,4 g
s j
2 g
si
2 · g si3 1 SDGNp3 7→p3 p2 : g si3 ≈c g si2 · g si3
g
s j u j
2 g
si ui
2 · g si ui3 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j u j
3 h
ri ui
2 ·hri ui3 given g1, g2,h1,h23
i ,5 g
s j
2 g
si
2 · g si3 1 statistical argument
g
s j u j
2 g
si ui
2 · g si (w0+i ·w1)3 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j u j
3 h
ri ui
2 · hri (w0+i ·w1)3 analogous to Sub-Gamei ,3
i ,6 g
s j
2 g
si
2 · g si3 1 DDHHNp3
g
s j u j
2 g
si ui
2 · g si (w0+i ·w1)3 1 h
r j u j
2 · h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3 analogous to Sub-Gamei ,2
i ,7 g
s j
2 g
si
2 · g
si
3 1 SD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3
g
s j u j
2 g
si ui
2 ·

g si (w0+i ·w1)3 1 h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
3 analogous to Sub-Gamei ,1
Fig. 4. Game sequence for our proof of Lemma 3 (Bilinear entropy expansion lemma (step one)).
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4 Simulating Composite-Order Groups in Prime-Order Groups
We build upon and extend the previous framework of Chen et al. [6, 11] for simulating composite-order
groups in prime-order ones. We provide prime-order analogues of the static assumptions SDGNp1 7→p1p2 ,DDH
HN
p1
used in the previous sections. Moreover, we show that these prime-order analogues follow from the standard
k-Linear assumption (and more generally, the MDDH assumption [9]) in prime-order bilinear groups.
Additional notation. Let A be a matrix over Zp . We use span(A) to denote the column span of A, and we use
span`(A) to denote matrices of width ` where each column lies in span(A); this means M ←R span`(A) is a
random matrix of width `where each column is chosen uniformly from span(A). We use basis(A) to denote a
basis of span(A), and we use (A1 |A2) to denote the concatenation of matrices A1,A2. If A is a m-by-n matrix
with m > n, we use A to denote the sub-matrix consisting of the first n rows and A the sub-matrix with
remaining m−n rows. We let In be the n-by-n identity matrix and 0 be a zero matrix whose size will be clear
from the context.
4.1 Prime-order groups and matrix Diffie-Hellman assumptions
A generator G takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a description G := (p,G1,G2,GT ,e), where p
is a prime of Θ(λ) bits, G1, G2 and GT are cyclic groups of order p, and e : G1×G2 →GT is a non-degenerate
bilinear map. We require that the group operations in G1, G2 and GT as well the bilinear map e are
computable in deterministic polynomial time with respect to λ. Let g1 ∈G1, g2 ∈G2 and gT = e(g1, g2) ∈GT
be the respective generators. We employ the implicit representation of group elements: for a matrix M over
Zp , we define [M]1 := g M1 , [M]2 := g M2 , [M]T := g MT , where exponentiation is carried out component-wise.
Also, given [A]1, [B]2, we let e([A]1, [B]2)= [AB]T .
We define the matrix Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption on G1 [9]:
Assumption 3 (MDDHmk,` Assumption) Let `> k ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1. We say that the MDDHmk,` assumption holds
if for all PPT adversariesA, the following advantage function is negligible in λ.
Adv
MDDHmk,`
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(G, [M]1, [MS]1)= 1]−Pr[A(G, [M]1, [U]1)= 1] |
where M←R Z`×kp , S←R Zk×mp and U←R Z`×mp .
The MDDH assumption on G2 can be defined in an analogous way. Escala et al. [9] showed that
k-Lin⇒MDDH1k,k+1 ⇒MDDHmk,` ∀`> k,m ≥ 1
with a tight security reduction. Henceforth, we will use MDDHk to denote MDDH
1
k,k+1.
4.2 Basis structure
We want to simulate composite-order groups whose order is the product of three primes. Fix parameters
`1,`2,`3,`W ≥ 1. Pick random
A1 ←R Z`×`1p ,A2 ←R Z`×`2p ,A3 ←R Z`×`3p
where ` := `1 +`2 +`3. Let (A‖1 | A‖2 | A‖3)> denote the inverse of (A1 | A2 | A3), so that A>i A‖i = I (known as
non-degeneracy) and A>i A
‖
j = 0 if i 6= j (known as orthogonality), as depicted in Fig 5. This generalizes the
constructions in [10, 11] where `1 = `2 = `3 = k.
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A1 A2 A3
A‖1 A
‖
2 A
‖
3
Fig. 5. Basis relations. Solid lines mean orthogonal, dashed lines mean non-degeneracy. Similar relations hold in composite-order
groups with (g1, g2, g3) in place of (A1,A2,A3) and (h1,h2,h3) in place of (A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3).
Correspondence. We have the following correspondence with composite-order groups:
gi 7→ [Ai ]1, g si 7→ [Ai s]1
w ∈ZN 7→W ∈Z`×`Wp , g wi 7→ [A>i W]1
The following statistical lemma is analogous to the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which tells us that w mod
p2 is uniformly random given g w1 , g
w
3 , where w ←R ZN :
Lemma 5 (statistical lemma). With probability 1−1/p over A1,A2,A3,A∥1,A∥2,A∥3, the following two distribu-
tions are statistically identical.
{ A>1 W,A
>
3 W, W } and { A
>
1 W,A
>
3 W, W+U(2) }
where W←R Z`×`Wp and U(2) ←R span`W (A‖2).
Proof. For any (A1,A2,A3,A
∥
1,A
∥
2,A
∥
3) satisfying the basis relations (shown in Fig 5), we may alternatively pick
W= W˜+W(2) where W˜←R Z`×`Wp , W(2) ←R span`W (A‖2).
This does not change the two distributions, but they now become
{ A>1 W˜,A
>
3 W˜,W˜+ W(2) } and { A>1 W˜,A>3 W˜,W˜+ W(2)+U(2) }.
Because the boxed terms have the same distribution, these two distributions are statistically identical. uunionsq
4.3 Prime-order Subgroup Decision Assumptions
We first describe the prime-order (A1 7→ A1,A2)-subgroup decision assumption, denoted by SDG1A1 7→A1,A2 . This
is analogous to the subgroup decision assumption in composite-order groups SDGNp1 7→p1p2 which asserts that
Gp1 ≈c Gp1p2 given h1,h3,h12 along with g1, g2, g3. By symmetry, we can permute the indices for A1,A2,A3.
Lemma 6 (MDDH`1,`1+`2 ⇒ SDG1A1 7→A1,A2 ). Under the MDDH`1,`1+`2 assumption in G1, there exists an efficient
sampler outputting random ([A1]1, [A2]1, [A3]1) (as described in Section 4.2) along with base basis(A
‖
1),
basis(A‖3), basis(A
‖
1,A
‖
2) (of arbitrary choice) such that the following advantage function is negligible in λ.
Adv
SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A2
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(D, [t0]1)= 1]−Pr[A(D, [t1]1)= 1] |
where
D := ( [A1]1, [A2]1, [A3]1,basis(A‖1),basis(A‖3),basis(A‖1,A‖2) ),
t0 ←R span(A1), t1 ←R span(A1,A2).
Similar statements were also implicit in [10, 11].
18
Proof. We prove the lemma from MDDH`1,`1+`2 assumption: for all PPT adversaries A, we construct an
algorithmB such that
Adv
SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A2
A
(λ)≤AdvMDDH`1 ,`1+`2
B
(λ).
The adversaryB gets as input [M]1 ∈G (`1+`2)×`11 and [u]1 ∈G`1+`21 , either u=Ms for s←R Z`1p or u←R Z`1+`2p ,
and proceeds as follows:
Programming A1,A2,A3,A
∥
1,A
∥
2,A
∥
3. Pick A˜←R GL`(Zp ) and define
(A1 |A2 |A3) := A˜

M
M I`2
I`3
 and (A∥1 |A∥2 |A∥3) := (A˜−1)>

(M
−1
)> −(M−1)>M>
I`2
I`3
 .
Observe thatB can simulate [A1,A2,A3]1 since it knows A˜ and [M]1.
Simulating basis(A‖1),basis(A
‖
3),basis(A
‖
1,A
‖
2). B can readily compute
basis(A∥3) := (A˜−1)>
 0
I`3

from A˜. Observe that we can define
basis(A∥1) :=A∥1 M
> = (A˜−1)>
I`1
0
 and basis(A∥1,A∥2) := (A∥1 |A∥2)
M> M>
I`2
= (A˜−1)>
I`1+`2
0

since M is full-rank with overwhelming probability, andB can also compute them from A˜.
Simulating the challenge. B outputs the challenge asA˜
u
0

1
.
Observe that if u = Ms for s ←R Z`1p , then the output challenge will be uniformly distributed over
[span(A1)]1; and if u←R Z`1+`2p , then the output challenge will be a random element from [span(A1,A2)]1.
The lemma then follows readily. uunionsq
4.4 Prime-order Subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumptions
We then formalize the prime-order A1-subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumption, denoted by DDH
G2
A1
. This
is analogous to the subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumption in the composite-order group DDHHNp1 which
ensures that {h
r j w
1 ,h
r j
1 } j∈[Q] ≈c {h
r j w
1 · h
u j
1 ,h
r j
1 } j∈[Q] given g1, g2, g3,h1,h2,h3 for Q = poly(λ). One can
permute the indices for A1,A2,A3.
Lemma 7 (MDDH`1
`W ,Q
⇒ DDHG2A1 ). Fix Q = poly(λ) with Q > `W ≥ 1. Under the MDDH
`1
`W ,Q
assumption in
G2, the following advantage function is negligible in λ
Adv
DDHG2A1
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0)= 1]−Pr[A(D,T1)= 1] |
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where
D := ( A1,A2,A3,A‖1,A‖2,A‖3; A>2 W,A>3 W ), W←R Z`×`Wp ;
T0 := ([WD]2, [D]2), T1 := ([WD+R(1)]2, [D]2), D←R Z`W×Qp ,R(1) ←R spanQ (A‖1).
Proof. We prove the lemma from MDDH`1
`W ,Q
assumption which says that
([D]2, [SD]2)≈c ([D]2, [SD+U]2)
where D ←R Z`W×Qp , S ←R Z`1×`Wp and U ←R Z`1×Qp . Concretely, for all PPT adversaries A, we construct an
algorithmB such that
Adv
DDHG2A1
A
(λ)≤AdvMDDH
`1
`W ,Q
B
(λ).
On input ([D]2, [T]2), algorithm B samples A1,A2,A3,A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3, pick W˜ ←R Z`×`Wp and implicitly set W :=
W˜+A∥1S. Output
A1,A2,A3,A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3; A
>
2 W˜,A
>
3 W˜,
[W˜D+A‖1T]2, [D]2.
Observe that when T = SD, the output is identical to (D,T0); and when T = SD+U and we set R(1) := A∥1U,
the output is identical to (D,T1). This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
5 Bilinear Entropy Expansion in Prime-Order Groups
In this section, we present our (bilinear) entropy expansion lemma in prime-order groups.
Entropy expansion lemma. We start by sampling A1,A2,A3,A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3 as in Section 4.2. Our prime-order
entropy expansion lemma is as follows:
Lemma 8 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma). Suppose `1,`3,`W ≥ k. Then, under the MDDHk
assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [ c >]1,
{
[ c >(W+ V(2)j )+ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where W,W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp ,V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2),D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c,c j ←R span(A1) in the left
distribution while c,c j ←R span(A1,A2) in the right distribution. Concretely, the distinguishing advantage
AdvEXPLEMA (λ) is at most
Adv
SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A2
B
(λ)+AdvDDH
G2
A2
B0
(λ)
+ n · (AdvSDG1A1 7→A1 ,A3
B1
(λ)+AdvDDH
G2
A3
B2
(λ)+AdvSD
G1
A3 7→A3 ,A2
B4
(λ)+AdvDDH
G2
A3
B6
(λ)+AdvSD
G1
A1 7→A1 ,A3
B7
(λ)
)+AdvDDHG2A2
B8
(λ)
where Time(B), Time(B0), Time(B1), Time(B2), Time(B4), Time(B6), Time(B7), Time(B8)≈Time(A).
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Remark 1 (Differences from overview in Section 1.3). We stated our prime-order expansion lemma for
general `1,`2,`3; for our KP-ABE, it suffices to set (`1,`2,`3)= (k,1,k). Compared to the informal statement
(8) in Section 1.3, we use A2 ∈ Z2k+1p instead of A2 ∈ Z(2k+1)×kp , and we introduced extra A2-components
corresponding to A>2 W,A
>
2 (W0+ j ·W1) in ct on the RHS. We have D j in place of Br j in the above statement,
though we will introduce B later on in Lemma 12. We also picked D j to be square matrices to enable random
self-reducibility of the sk-terms. Finally, V(2)j ,U
(2)
j correspond to V j ,U j in the informal statement, and in
particular, we have A>1 V
(2)
j =A>1 U(2)j = 0.
Analogous to the composite-order setting, we prove the lemma in two steps via the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma (step one)). Suppose `1,`3,`W ≥ k. Then, under the
MDDHk assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp ,U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2),D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c j ←R span(A1) in the left distribution while
c j ←R span(A1,A2) in the right distribution. Concretely, the distinguishing advantage AdvSTEP1A (λ) is at most
Adv
DDHG2A2
B0
(λ)+n · (AdvSDG1A1 7→A1 ,A3
B1
(λ)+AdvDDH
G2
A3
B2
(λ)+AdvSD
G1
A3 7→A3 ,A2
B4
(λ)+AdvDDH
G2
A3
B6
(λ)+AdvSD
G1
A1 7→A1 ,A3
B7
(λ)
)
where Time(B0), Time(B1), Time(B2), Time(B4), Time(B6), Time(B7)≈Time(A).
Lemma 10 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma (step two)). Suppose `W ≥ k. Then, under the MDDHk
assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1
ct : [c(2)
>
]1,
{
[c(2)
>
W+c(2)j
>
U(2)j ]1, [c
(2)
j
>
]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [U
(2)
j D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1
ct : [c(2)
>
]1,
{
[c(2)
>
(W+ V(2)j )+c(2)j
>
U(2)j ]1, [c
(2)
j
>
]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2, [U(2)j D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where W ←R Z`×`Wp , V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c(2),c(2)j ←R span(A2). Concretely, the
distinguishing advantage AdvSTEP2A (λ) is bounded by Adv
DDHG2A2
B8
(λ) where Time(B8)≈Time(A).
Proof. This follows from the DDHG2A2 assumption (with Q = n ·`W ), which asserts
{ [WD j ]2, [D j ]2 } j∈[n] ≈c { [WD j +R(2)j ]2, [D j ]2 } j∈[n] where D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , R(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2).
Formally, the adversaryB8 gets as input {[T j ]2, [D j ]2} j∈[n] along with A1,A2, A∥2, A
>
1 W. It samples s←R Z`2p and
∆ j ←R Z`2×`2p for all j ∈ [n], and define s>j = s>∆ j . Pick U˜ j ←R Z`2×`Wp for all j ∈ [n] and implicitly program
U(2)j :=A∥2(U˜ j −∆−1j A>2 W),
and runsA on input 
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1
ct : [s>A>2 ]1,
{
[s>∆ j U˜ j ]1, [s>∆ j A>2 ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[T j ]2, [D j ]2, [A
∥
2U˜ j D j −A∥2∆−1j A>2 T j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 .
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Observe that
– When T j = WD j and if we write U(2)j D j = A∥2U˜ j D j −A∥2∆−1j A>2 WD j , then s>∆ j U˜ j = (s>∆ j A>2 )(A∥U˜ j ) =
s>A>2 W+ (s>∆ j )A>2 U(2)j and the distribution we feed toA is identical to the left distribution.
– When T j =WD j+R(2)j and if we write U(2)j D j =A∥2U˜ j D j−A∥2∆−1j A>2 (WD j+R(2)j ), then s>∆ j U˜ j = s>A>2 (W+
R(2)j D
−1
j )+ (s>∆ j )A>2 U(2)j and the distribution we feed toA is identical to the right distribution when we
set V(2)j :=R(2)j D−1j .
This completes the proof. uunionsq
We may now complete the proof of Lemma 8 using Lemmas 9 and 10. The proof of Lemmas 9 is deferred
to Section 5.1.
Proof (of Lemma 8). The statement follows readily from the following hybrid argument:
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 LHS in Lemma 8
A1 7→(A1,A2)≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [ c >]1,
{
[ c >W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 where c←R span(A1,A2)
Lemma 9≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>W+ c j >(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where c j ←R span(A1,A2)
Lemma 10≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>(W+ V(2)j )+c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

RHS in Lemma 8
It is easy to check every transitions as follows:
– The first transition follows from the SDG1A1 7→A1,A2 assumption asserting that
[c←R span(A1)]1 ≈c [c←R span(A1,A2)]1 given [A1]1, [A2]1.
In the reduction, we sample W,W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp and generate aux and sk honestly.
– The second transition follows from Lemma 9. In the reduction, we sample W ←R Z`×`Wp and simulate
[A>1 W]1 in aux honestly. By [A
>
1 ]1 and [A
>
2 ]1, we can simulate ([c
>]1, [c>W]1) honestly where c ←R
span(A1,A2). The simulation of {[WD j ]2} j∈[n] in sk is direct.
– The third transition follows from Lemma 10. In the reduction, we sample W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp . Then we
can simulate [A>1 W0]1 and [A
>
1 W1]1 in aux, and {[(W0 + j ·W1)D j ]2} j∈[n] in sk from {[D j ]2} j∈[n]. As for
ct, we simulate {[c(1)
>
]1, [c(1)
>
W+ c(1)j
>
(W0 + j ·W1)]1, [c(1)j
>
]1} j∈[n] where c(1),c(1)j ←R span(A1) using
([A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1). uunionsq
5.1 Entropy epansion lemma: Step one
We prove Lemma 9 via the following game sequence summarized in Fig 6. By ct j (resp. sk j ), we denote the
j ’th tuple of ct (resp. sk).
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Game0. The adversaryA is given the left distribution in Lemma 9.
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 .
Game0′ . We modify the distribution of sk as follows:
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
where U(2)1 , . . . ,U
(2)
n ←R span`W (A∥2). We claim that Game0 ≈c Game0′ . This follows from DDHG2A2 assumption
which tells us that
{[D j ]2, [W0D j ]2} j∈[n] ≈c {[D j ]2, [(W0+U(2)j )D j ]2} j∈[n]
given A>1 ,A
>
1 W0. See Lemma 30 for details.
Gamei (i = 1, . . . ,n+1). We change the distribution of ct:
ct :
{
[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j<i{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j≥i
where c j ←R span(A1,A2) for j < i and c j ←R span(A1) for all remaining j ≥ i . It is easy to see that Game0′ ≡
Game1. To show that Gamei ≈c Gamei+1, we will require another sequence of sub-games.
Sub-Gamei ,1. Identical to Gamei except that we modify cti as follows:
cti : [ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1)]1, [ ci >]1
where ci ←R span(A1,A3) . We claim that Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1. This follows from SDG1A1 7→A1,A3 assumption,
which tells us that
[span(A1)]1 ≈c [span(A1,A3)]1 given [A1,A2]1,basis(A∥2).
In the reduction, we will sample W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp and U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2) using basis(A∥2) , and simulate
aux, {ct j } j 6=i , sk honestly. See Lemma 31 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,2. We modify the distributions of all sk j with j 6= i (while keeping ski unchanged):
sk j ( j 6= i ) : [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j + U(3)j )D j ]2
where U(3)j ←R span`W (A∥3). We claim that Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2. This follows from DDHG2A3 , which
tells us that
{[D j ]2, [W1D j ]2} j 6=i ≈c {[D j ]2, [(W1+ U˜(3)j )D j ]2} j 6=i given A1,A2,A3,A∥2,A>1 W1,A>2 W1
where U˜(3)j ←R span`W (A∥3). In the reduction, we will program W0 := W˜0− i ·W1 with W˜0 ←R Z`×`Wp so that we
can simulate W0+i ·W1 in cti , and then implicitly set U(3)j = ( j−i )·U˜(3)j for all j 6= i . See Lemma 32 for details.
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Sub-Gamei ,3. We modify the distributions of cti and ski :
cti : [c>i (W0+ i ·W1+ U(2)i +U(3)i )]1, [c>i ]1
ski : [Di ]2, [(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i + U(3)i )Di ]2
where U(3)i ←R span`W (A∥3). We claim that Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,3. This follows from the following
statistical argument:
(A>1 W0,A
>
2 W0,W0, {W0+U(3)j } j 6=i )≡ (A>1 W0,A>2 W0,W0+ U(3)i , {W0+U(3)j } j 6=i ).
Furthermore, c>i U
(2)
i = 0 since ci ∈ span(A1,A3) and A>1 A∥2 = A>3 A∥2 = 0, so the term U(2)i in cti is introduced
“for free”. See Lemma 33 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,4. We modify the distribution of cti :
cti : [ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i +U(3)i )]1, [ ci
>]1 where ci ←R span(A1,A2,A3) .
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,3 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,4. This follows from SDG1A3 7→A3,A2 which tells us that
[span(A3)]1 ≈c [span(A3,A2)]1 given [A2,A1]1,basis(A∥2,A∥3).
In the reduction, we sample W0,W1 and (U
(2)
j +U(3)j )←R span`W (A∥2,A∥3) using basis(A∥2,A∥3) for all j ∈ [n]. Then
aux, sk and {ct j } j 6=i can be simulated honestly. See Lemma 34 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,5. We change the distributions of cti and ski :
cti : [c>i (W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i + 
 U(3)i )]1, [c
>
i ]1
ski : [Di ]2, [(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i + 
 U(3)i )Di ]2
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,4 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,5. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡
Sub-Gamei ,3. See Lemma 35 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,6. We change the distributions of all sk j with j 6= i :
sk j ( j 6= i ) : [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j + 
 U(3)j )D j ]2
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,5 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,6. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,1 ≡
Sub-Gamei ,2. See Lemma 36 for details.
Sub-Gamei ,7. We change the distribution of cti :
cti : [ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i )]1, [ ci
>]1,
where ci ←R span(A1,A2) . We claim that Sub-Gamei ,6 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,7. The proof is completely analogous
to that ofGamei ≡ Sub-Gamei ,1. See Lemma 37 for details. Furthermore, observe thatSub-Gamei ,7 is actually
identical to Gamei+1.
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Gamen+1. In Gamen+1, we have:
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where c j ←R span(A1,A2), U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2) for all j ∈ [n]. This is exactly the right distribution of Lemma 9.
Game CT j < i i j > i SK j 6= i i Remark & aux
c j ←R ?
W0+ j ·W1+ ? W0+ j ·W1+ ?
0 span(A1)
0 0
0′ span(A1) U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2); DDH
G2
A2
:
0 U(2)j {[D j ]2, [W0D j ]2} j∈[n] ≈c {[D j ]2, [(W0+U(2)j )D j ]2} j∈[n]
i span(A1,A2) span(A1) span(A1) Game1 =Game0′′ ,
U(2)j 0 0 U
(2)
j U
(2)
i Gamei =Gamei−1,7
i ,1 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A3) span(A1) SD
G1
A1 7→A1 ,A3 : [span(A1)]1 ≈c [span(A1,A3)]1
U(2)j 0 0 U
(2)
j U
(2)
i given [A1,A2]1,basis(A
∥
2)
i ,2 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A3) span(A1) U
(3)
j ←R span`W (A∥3); DDH
G2
A3
: Given W0+ i ·W1,
U(2)j 0 0 U
(2)
j + U(3)j U(2)i {[D j ]2, [W1D j ]2} j 6=i ≈c {[D j ]2, [(W1+ U˜(3)j )D j ]2} j 6=i
with U(3)j = ( j − i ) · U˜(3)j
i ,3 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A3) span(A1) statistical lemma:
U(2)j U
(2)
i +U(3)i 0 U(2)j +U(3)j U(2)i + U(3)i (W0, {W0+U(3)j } j 6=i )≡ (W0+U(3)i , {W0+U(3)j } j 6=i )
i ,4 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A2,A3) span(A1) SD
G1
A3 7→A3 ,A2 : [span(A3)]1 ≈c [span(A2,A3)]1
U(2)j U
(2)
i +U(3)i 0 U(2)j +U(3)j U(2)i +U(3)i given [A2,A1]1,basis(A∥2,A∥3)
i ,5 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A2,A3) span(A1) statistical argument
U(2)j U
(2)
i +U
(3)
i 0 U
(2)
j +U(3)j U(2)i +U
(3)
i analogous to Sub-Gamei ,3
i ,6 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A2,A3) span(A1) DDH
G2
A3
U(2)j U
(2)
i 0 U
(2)
j +  U
(3)
j U
(2)
i analogous to Sub-Gamei ,2
i ,7 span(A1,A2) span(A1,A2,A3) span(A1) SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A3
U(2)j U
(2)
i 0 U
(2)
j U
(2)
i analogous to Sub-Gamei ,1
Fig. 6. Game sequence for our proof of Lemma 9 (Bilinear entropy expansion lemma (step one)). There are two rows for each game:
The 1st one indicates where c j are sampled from; and the 2nd one indicates whether the hiding matrix U
2
j (and U
3
j ) will appear.
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6 KP-ABE for Monotone Span Programs in Composite-Order Groups
In this section, we present our adaptively secure, unbounded KP-ABE for monotone span programs based
on static assumptions in composite-order groups (cf. Section 3.1).
6.1 Construction
Setup(1λ,1n): On input (1λ,1n), sample G := (N = p1p2p3,GN , HN ,GT ,e) ← G(1λ) and select random
generators g1, h1 and h123 of Gp1 , Hp1 and HN , respectively. Pick
w, w0, w1 ←R ZN , α←R ZN ,
a pairwise independent hash function H : GT → {0,1}λ, and output the master public and secret key pair
mpk := ( (N ,GN , HN ,GT ,e); g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 , e(g1,h123)α; H )
and
msk := (h123,h1,α, w, w0, w1 ) .
Enc(mpk,x,m): On input an attribute vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n and m ∈ {0,1}λ, pick s, s j ←R ZN for all
j ∈ [n] and output
ctx :=
(
C0 := g s1, { C1, j := g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , C2, j := g
s j
1 } j :x j=1, C :=H(e(g1,h123)αs) ·m
) ∈G2n+1N × {0,1}λ.
KeyGen(mpk,msk,M): On input a monotone span program M ∈Zn×`′N , pick u←R Z`
′−1
N and r j ←R ZN for all
j ∈ [n], and output
skM :=
(
{ K0, j := hM j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 , K1, j := h
r j
1 , K2, j := h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
) ∈H 3nN .
Dec(mpk,skM,ctx): If x satisfies M, compute ω1, . . . ,ωn ∈Zp such that∑
j :x j=1
ω j M j = 1.
Then, compute
K ← ∏
j :x j=1
(
e(C0,K0, j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )
)ω j ,
and recover the message as m ←C /H(K ) ∈ {0,1}λ.
Correctness. For all M and x such that x satisfies M, we have∏
j :x j=1
(
e(C0,K0, j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )
)ω j
= ∏
j :x j=1
(
e(g s1, h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 ) ·e(g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j
1 )
−1 ·e(g s j1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 )
)ω j
=e(g1,h123)s
∑
j :x j =1ω j M j
(α
u
)
= e(g1,h123)sα.
This readily proves the correctness.
6.2 Proof of Security
We prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 1. Under the subgroup decision assumptions and the subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumptions (cf.
Section 3.1), the unbounded KP-ABE scheme described in this section (cf. Section 6.1) is adaptively secure
(cf. Section 2.2).
Main technical lemma. We prove the following technical lemma. Our proof consists of two steps. We first
apply the entropy expansion lemma (see Lemma 2) and obtain a copy of the LOSTW KP-ABE (variant there-
of) in the p2-subgroup. We may then carry out the classic dual system methodology used for establishing
adaptive security of the LOSTW KP-ABE in the p2-subgroup with the p3-subgroup as the semi-functional
space.
Lemma 11. For any adversary A that makes at most Q key queries against the unbounded KP-ABE scheme,
there exist adversariesB0,B1,B2,B2 such that:
AdvABEA (λ)≤AdvEXPLEMB0 (λ)+Adv
SDGNp2 7→p2 p3
B1
(λ)+Q ·AdvSD
HN
p2 7→p2 p3
B2
(λ)+Q ·AdvSD
HN
p2 7→p2 p3
B3
(λ)
where Time(B0),Time(B1),Time(B2),Time(B3) ≈ Time(A). In particular, we achieve security loss O(n +
Q) based on the SDHNp1 7→p1p2 , SD
HN
p1 7→p1p3 , SD
GN
p1 7→p1p2 , DDH
HN
p2 , SD
GN
p1 7→p1p3 , DDH
HN
p3 , SD
GN
p3 7→p3p2 , SD
GN
p2 7→p2p3 ,
SDHNp2 7→p2p3 assumptions.
The proof follows a series of games based on the dual system methodology, and outlined in Fig. 7. We
first define the auxiliary distributions, upon which we can describe the games.
Game CT
SK
Justification
κ< i κ= i κ> i
0 Normal Normal real game
0’ E-normal E-normal entropy expansion lemma, Lemma 2
i SF SF E-normal E-normal SDGNp2 7→p2p3 , Gamei =Gamei−1,3
i ,1 — — P-normal — SDHNp2 7→p2p3
i ,2 — — P-SF — statistical lemma, Lemma 1
i ,3 — — SF — SDHNp2 7→p2p3
Final random m SF statistical hiding
Fig. 7. Game sequence for proving the adaptive security of our composite-order unbounded KP-ABE.
Auxiliary distributions. We define various forms of a ciphertext (of message m under attribute vector x):
– Normal: Generated by Enc.
– E-normal: Same as a normal ciphertext except that a copy of normal ciphertext is created in Gp2 and
then we use the substitution:
w 7→ v j mod p2 in j ’th component and w0+ j ·w1 7→ u j mod p2 (10)
where v j ,u j ←R ZN . Concretely, an E-normal ciphertext is of the form
ctx :=
(
g s1 · g s2 , { g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j :x j=1, H(e(g
s
1 · g s2 ,hα123)) ·m
)
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where g2 is a random generator of Gp2 and s, s j ←R ZN .
– SF: Same as E-normal ciphertext except that we copy all entropy from Gp2 to Gp3 . Concretely, an SF
ciphertext is of the form
ctx :=
(
g s1 ·g s2 · g s3 , { g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·g
sv j+s j u j
2 · g
sv j+s j u j
3 , g
s j
1 ·g
s j
2 · g
s j
3 } j :x j=1, H(e(g
s
1 ·g s2 · g s3 ,hα123))·m
)
where g3 is a random generator of Gp3 and s, s j ←R ZN .
Then we pick αˆ←R ZN and define various forms of a key (for span program M):
– Normal: Generated by KeyGen.
– E-normal: Same as a normal key except that we make a copy of {h
r j w
1 ,h
r j
1 ,h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n] in Hp2 and
use the same substitution as in (10). Concretely, an E-normal key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 · h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
1 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]
)
where h123, h1 and h2 are respective random generators of HN , Hp1 and Hp2 , u←R Z`
′−1
N and r j ←R ZN .
– P-normal: Same as E-normal key except that we make a copy of {h
r j v j
2 ,h
r j
2 ,h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n] in Hp3 . Concretely,
a P-normal key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 ·h
r j v j
2 · h
r j v j
3 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 · h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 · h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n]
)
where h3 is a random generator of Hp3 , u←R Z`
′−1
N and r j ←R ZN .
– P-SF: Same as P-normal key except that αˆ is introduced in Hp3 . Concretely, a P-SF key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ h
M j
(α
u
)
123 · h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r j w
1 ·h
r j v j
2 ·h
r j v j
3 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n]
)
where u←R Z`′−1N and r j ←R ZN .
– SF: Same as P-SF key except that {h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 ,h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n] is removed. Concretely, a SF key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r j w
1 ·h
r j v j
2 ·
h
r j v j
3 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 ·  h
r j
3 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 ·
h
r j u j
3 } j∈[n]
)
where u←R Z`′−1N and r j ←R ZN .
Here E, P, SF means “expanded”, “pesudo”, “semi-functional”, respectively.
Games. We describe the game sequence in detail.
Game0. The real security game (cf. Section 2.2) where all keys and ciphertext are normal.
Game′0. Identical to Game0 except that all keys and the challenge ciphertext are E-normal. We claim that
Game0 ≈c Game0′ . This follows from the entropy expansion lemma (see Lemma 2). In the reduction, on
input 
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : C0, {C1, j , C2, j } j∈[n]
sk : {K0, j , K1, j , K2, j } j∈[n]
 ,
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we select a random generator h123 of HN , sample α←R ZN , uκ←R Z`′−1N , r˜ j ,κ←R ZN for j ∈ [n] and κ ∈ [Q],
and simulate the game with 
mpk : aux, e(g1,h123)α
ctx∗ : {C0, C1, j , C2, j } j :x∗j =1,e(C0,h
α
123) ·mb
skκM : { h
M j
(
α
uκ
)
123 ·K
r˜ j ,κ
0, j ,K
r˜ j ,κ
1, j ,K
r˜ j ,κ
2, j } j∈[n]
 .
See Lemma 38 for details.
Gamei . Identical to Game0′ except that the first i −1 keys and the challenge ciphertext is SF. We claim that
Game0′ ≈c Game1. This follows from the SDGNp2 7→p2p3 assumption, which asserts that
( g s2, {g
s j
2 } j∈[n] )≈c ( g s2 · g s3 , {g
s j
2 · g
s j
3 } j∈[n] ) given g1,h1,h2.
In the reduction, we sample w, w0, w1, v j ,u j ←R ZN ,h123 ←R HN , α←R ZN and simulate mpk,skκM honestly.
See Lemma 39 for details. To show that Gamei ≈c Gamei+1, we will require another sequence of sub-games.
Gamei ,1. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is P-normal. We claim that Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1. This
follows from SDHNp2 7→p2p3 assumption which asserts that
{h
r j
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 } j∈[n] given g1, g23,h1,h2,h3
In the reduction, we sample w, w0, w1, v j ,u j ,α, αˆ←R ZN and select a random generator h123 of HN , and
simulate mpk,ct, {skκM}κ 6=i honestly. See Lemma 40 for details.
Gamei ,2. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is P-SF. We claim that Gamei ,1 ≡ Gamei ,2. This follows
from Lemma 1 in Section 2 which ensures that for any x that does not satisfy M,
(
κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
h2, {h
v j
2 } j∈[n],α, αˆ;
SF ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{g2, g
v j
2 , g3, g
v j
3 } j :x j=1;
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n] )
≡ ( h2, {hv j2 } j∈[n],α, αˆ; {g2, g
v j
2 , g3, g
v j
3 } j :x j=1; {h
M j
(α
u
)
123 · h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P-SF i ’th sk
)
where v j ←R ZN and u ←R Z`′−1N , and for all α, αˆ, and r j 6= 0 mod p3. It is straight-forward to compute the
remaining terms in mpk, the challenge ciphertext and the Q secret keys by sampling g1, w, w0, w1,u j , s, s j
ourselves. See Lemma 41 for details.
Gamei ,3. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is SF. We claim that Gamei ,2 ≈c Gamei ,3. The proof is
completely analogous to that of Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1. See Lemma 42 for details. Furthermore, observe that
Gamei ,3 is actually identical to Gamei+1.
GameFinal. Identical to GameQ+1 except that the challenge ciphertext is a SF one for a random message in
GT . We claim that GameQ+1 ≡GameFinal. This follows from the fact that
(
mpk︷ ︸︸ ︷
e(g1,h
α
123),
SF sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
hα123 ·hαˆ3 ,
SF ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
e(g s123,h
α
123) )≡ ( e(g1,hα123), hα123, e(g s123,hα123 · hαˆ3 ) )
where g123, h123 and h3 are respective random generators of GN , HN and Hp3 , α, αˆ←R ZN . The message
mb is statistically hidden by e(g
s
123,h
αˆ
3 ). See Lemma 43 for details. In GameFinal, the view of the adversary is
statistically independent of the challenge bit b. Hence, AdvFinal = 0.
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7 KP-ABE for Monotone Span Programs in Prime-Order Groups
In this section, we present our adaptively secure, unbounded KP-ABE for monotone span programs
programs based on the k-Lin assumption in prime-order groups.
7.1 Construction
Setup(1λ,1n): On input (1λ,1n), sample
A1 ←R Z(2k+1)×kp ,B←R Z(k+1)×kp , W,W0,W1 ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p , k←R Z2k+1p
and output the master public and secret key pair
mpk := ( [A>1 ,A>1 W,A>1 W0,A>1 W1]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ) ∈Gk×(2k+1)1 × (Gk×(k+1)1 )3×GkT
and
msk := ( k, B, W, W0, W1 ) .
Enc(mpk,x,m): On input an attribute vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n and m ∈GT , pick c,c j ←R span(A1) for
all j ∈ [n] and output
ctx :=
(
C0 := [c>]1, { C1, j := [c>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1,C2, j := [c>j ]1 } j :x j=1, C := e([c>]1, [k]2) ·m
)
∈G2k+11 × (Gk+11 ×G2k+11 )n ×GT .
KeyGen(mpk,msk,M): On input a monotone span program M ∈ Zn×`′p , pick K′ ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p , d j ←R
span(B) for all j ∈ [n], and output
skM :=
(
{ K0, j := [(k‖K′)M>j +Wd j ]2, K1, j := [d j ]2, K2, j := [(W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2 } j∈[n]
)
∈ (G2k+12 ×Gk+12 ×G2k+12 )n .
Dec(mpk,skM,ctx): If x satisfies M, compute ω1, . . . ,ωn ∈Zp such that∑
j :x j=1
ω j M j = 1.
Then, compute
K ← ∏
j :x j=1
(
e(C0,K0, j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )
)ω j ,
and recover the message as m ←C /K ∈GT .
Correctness. For all M and x such that x satisfies M, we have
e(C0,K0, j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )
=e([c>]1, [(k‖K′)M>j +Wd j ]2) ·e([c>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [d j ]2)−1 ·e([c>j ]1, [(W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2)
=[c>(k‖K′)M>j +c>Wd j −c>Wd j −c>j (W0+ j ·W1)d j +c>j (W0+ j ·W1)d j ]T
=[c>(k‖K′)M>j ]T
for each j ∈ [n] and
K = ∏
j :x j=1
(
e(C0,K0, j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )
)ω j
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= ∏
j :x j=1
[ω j c
>(k‖K′)M>j ]T = [c>(k‖K′) ·
∑
j :x j=1
ω j M
>
j ]T = [c>(k‖K′)1>]T = [c>k]T = e([c>]1, [k]2).
This readily proves correctness.
7.2 Bilinear entropy expansion lemma, revisited
With the additional basis B ∈ Z(k+1)×kp , we need a variant of the entropy expansion lemma in Lemma 8
with (`1,`2,`3,`W ) = (k,1,k,k + 1) where the columns of D j are drawn from span(B) instead of Zk+1p (see
Lemma 12), which we may deduce readily from Lemma 8, thanks to the MDDHk assumption.
Lemma 12 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma, revisited). Pick basis (A1,a2,A3) ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p ×
Z2k+1p ×Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p and define its dual (A∥1,a∥2,A∥3) as in Section 4.2. With B←R Z(k+1)×kp , we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[WD j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [ c >]1,
{
[ c >(W+ V(2)j )+ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where W,W0,W1 ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p ,V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R spank+1(a∥2),D j ←R spank+1(B), and c,c j ←R span(A1) in the
left distribution while c,c j ←R span(A1,a2) in the right distribution. We let AdvEXPLEMREVA (λ) denote the
distinguishing advantage.
We claim that the lemma follows from the basic entropy expansion lemma (Lemma 8) and the MDDHk
assumption, which tells us that
{[D j ←R Z(k+1)×(k+1)p ]2} j∈[n] ≈c {[D j ←R spank+1(B)]2} j∈[n].
Concretely, for allA, we can constructB0 andB1 with Time(B0),Time(B1)≈Time(A) such that
AdvEXPLEMREVA (λ)≤AdvEXPLEMB0 (λ)+2 ·Adv
MDDHn(k+1)k,k+1
B1
(λ).
The proof is straight-forward by demonstrating that the left (resp. right) distributions in Lemma 8 and
Lemma 12 are indistinguishable under the MDDHk assumption and then applying Lemma 8. In the
reduction, we sample W,W0,W1 ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p (and V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R spank+1(a∥2) for the right distributions)
and simulate aux,ct honestly.
7.3 Proof of Security
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Under the MDDHk assumption in prime-order groups (cf. Section 4.1), the unbounded KP-
ABE scheme for monotone span programs described in this Section (cf. Section 7.1) is adaptively secure
(cf. Section 2.2).
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Main technical lemma. We prove the following technical lemma. As with the composite-order scheme in
Section 6, we first apply the new entropy expansion lemma in Lemma 12 and obtain a copy of the CGW
KP-ABE (variant-thereof) in the a2-subspace. We may then carry out the classic dual system methodology
used for establishing adaptive security of the CGW KP-ABE.
Lemma 13. For any adversary A that makes at most Q key queries against the unbounded KP-ABE scheme,
there exist adversariesB0,B1,B2 such that:
AdvABEA (λ)≤AdvEXPLEMREVB0 (λ)+Q ·Adv
MDDHnk,k+1
B1
(λ)+Q ·AdvMDDH
n
k,k+1
B2
(λ)+O(1/p).
whereTime(B0),Time(B1),Time(B2)≈Time(A). In particular, we achieve security loss O(n+Q) based on the
MDDHk assumption.
Game CT
SK
Justification
κ< i κ= i κ> i
0 Normal Normal real game
0’ E-normal E-normal entropy expansion lemma (revisited), Lemma 12
i — SF E-normal E-normal Gamei =Gamei−1,3
i ,1 — — P-normal — MDDHk
i ,2 — — P-SF — statistical lemma, Lemma 1
i ,3 — — SF — MDDHk
Final random m SF statistical hidding
Fig. 8. Game sequence for proving the adaptive security of our prime-order unbounded KP-ABE.
The proof follows a series of games based on the dual system methodology, and outlined in Fig. 8. We
first define the auxiliary distributions, from which we can describe the games. A notable difference from the
composite-order setting in Section 6 is that we do not define SF ciphertexts.
Auxiliary distributions. We define various forms of ciphertext (of message m under attribute vector x):
– Normal: Generated by Enc; in particular, c,c j ←R span(A1).
– E-normal: Same as a normal ciphertext except that c,c j ←R span(A1,a2) and we use the substitution:
W 7→ V̂ j :=W+V(2)j in j ’th component and W0+ j ·W1 7→ Û j :=W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j (11)
where U(2)j ,V
(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2). Concretely, an E-normal ciphertext is of the form
ctx :=
(
[c>]1, { [c> V̂ j +c>j Û j ]1, [c>j ]1 } j :x j=1, e([c>]1, [k]2) ·m
)
where c,c j ←R span(A1,a2) .
Then we pick α←R Zp and define various forms of key (for span program M):
– Normal: Generated by KeyGen.
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– E-normal: Same as a normal key except that we use the same substitution as in (11). Concretely, an
E-normal key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ [(k‖K′)M>j + V̂ j d j ]2, [d j ]2, [ Û j d j ]2 } j∈[n]
)
where d j ←R span(B),K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p .
– P-normal: Sample d j ←R Zk+1p in an E-normal key. Concretely, a P-normal key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ [(k‖K′)M>j + V̂ j d j ]2, [d j ]2, [Û j d j ]2 } j∈[n]
)
where d j ←R Zk+1p ,K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p .
– P-SF: Replace k with k+αa∥2 in a P-normal key. Concretely, a P-SF key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ [(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)M>j + V̂ j d j ]2, [d j ]2, [Û j d j ]2 } j∈[n]
)
where d j ←R Zk+1p ,K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p .
– SF: Sample d j ←R span(B) in a P-SF key. Concretely, a SF key is of the form
skM :=
(
{ [(k+αa∥2‖K′)M>j + V̂ j d j ]2, [d j ]2, [Û j d j ]2 } j∈[n]
)
where d j ←R span(B) ,K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p .
Here E, P, SF means “expanded”, “pesudo”, “semi-functional”, respectively.
Games. We describe the game sequence in detail.
Game0. The real security game (c.f. Section 2.2) where all keys and ciphertext are normal.
Game0′ . Identical to Game0 except that all keys and the challenge ciphertext are E-normal. We claim that
Game0 ≈c Game0′ . This follows from our new prime-order entropy expansion lemma (see Lemma 12). In the
reduction, on input 
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [C0]1,
{
[C1, j ]1, [C2, j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[K0, j ]2, [K1, j ]2, [K2, j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 ,
we sample k←R Z2k+1p , K′κ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p , d˜ j ,κ←R Zk+1p for j ∈ [n] and κ ∈ [Q], and simulate the game with
mpk : aux, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2)
ctx∗ : [C0]1,
{
[C1, j ]1, [C2, j ]1
}
j :x∗j =1,e([C0]1, [k]2) ·mβ
skκM :
{
[(k‖K′κ)M>j +K0, j d˜ j ,κ]2, [K1, j d˜ j ,κ]2, [K2, j d˜ j ,κ]2
}
j∈[n]
 .
In both cases, we set d j ,κ :=D j d˜ j ,κ where D j ←R spank+1(B) as defined in the new entropy expansion lemma
(Lemma 12). Therefore all d j ,κ are uniformly distributed over span(B) with high probability. See Lemma 44
for details.
Gamei . Identical to Game0′ except that the first i −1 keys are SF. It is easy to see that Game0′ ≡ Game1. To
show that Gamei ≈c Gamei+1, we will require another sequence of sub-games.
Gamei ,1. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is P-normal. We claim that Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1. This
follows from the MDDHnk,k+1 assumption asserting
{[d j ,i ←R span(B)]2} j∈[n] ≈c {[d j ,i ←R Zk+1p ]2} j∈[n].
In the reduction, on input [B]2, {[t j ]2} j∈[n], we sample A1,a2,W,W0,W1,k and V(2)j ,U
(2)
j ,α, and honestly
simulate mpk,ct and {skκM}κ 6=i . The i ’th key is created using {[t j ]2} j∈[n]. See Lemma 45 for details.
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Gamei ,2. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is P-SF. We claim that Gamei ,1 ≡ Gamei ,2. This follows
from Lemma 1 in Section 2 which ensures that for any x that does not satisfy M,
( κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
k,α,B,V(2)j B;
E-normal ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{V(2)j } j :x j=1;
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(k‖K′)M>j +V(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]
)
≡ (k,α,B,V(2)j B; {V(2)j } j :x j=1; {(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)M>j +V(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P-SF i ’th sk
)
where K′ ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p ,V
(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2), and for any k,α,B, and d j ∉ span(B). It is straight-forward
to compute the remaining terms in mpk, the challenge ciphertext and the Q secret keys by sampling
A1,W,W0,W1,U
(2)
j ,c,c j ,d j ourselves. See Lemma 46 for details.
Gamei ,3. Identical to Gamei except that the i ’th key is SF. We claim that Gamei ,2 ≈c Gamei ,3. The proof is
completely analogous to that of Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1. See Lemma 47 for details. Furthermore, observe that
Gamei ,3 is actually identical to Gamei+1.
GameFinal. Identical to GameQ+1, except that the challenge ciphertext is a SF one for a random message in
GT . We claim that GameQ+1 ≡GameFinal. This follows from the fact that
(e(
mpk︷ ︸︸ ︷
[A1]1, [k]2),
SF sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
k+αa∥2,
SF ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
e([c>]1, [k]2) ·mb)= (e([A1]1, [k]2), k, e([c>]1, [k+ αa∥2 ]2)),
where k ←R Z2k+1p and α ←R Zp . The message mb is statistically hidden by e([c>]1, [a∥2]2)α since c ∈
span(A1,a2). See Lemma 48 for details. In GameFinal, the view of the adversary is statistically independent
of the challenge bit b. Hence, AdvFinal = 0.
8 CP-ABE for Monotone Span Programs
In this section, we present our adaptively secure, unbounded CP-ABE for monotone span programs based
on the k-Lin assumption in prime-order groups.
8.1 Warm-up: a composite-order scheme
As before, we begin with a scheme in composite-order groups:
mpk := (g1, g u01 , g w1 , g w01 , g w11 ,e(g1,h123)α) (12)
ctM := (g s1, {g
s(u0,u)M>j +s j w
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n], e(g1,h123)
αs ·m)
skx := (hα123 ·hu0r1 , hr1 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j
1 } j :x j=1)
Decryption proceeds by first computing {e(g1,h1)
s(u0,u)M>j r } j :x j=1 and then e(g1,h1)su0r and e(g1,h123)αs .
Bilinear entropy expansion. To analyze this scheme, we would require the following variant of our entropy
expansion lemma where we basically swap ct and sk (on the LHS, instead of having g s1, g
sw
1 in ct, we have
hr1 ,h
r w
1 in sk):
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
s j w
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
sk : hr1 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j
1 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g
s j w
1 · g
s j v j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : hr1 · hr2 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r v j+r j u j
2 , h
r j
1 · h
r j
2 } j∈[n]
 (13)
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where
w, w0, w1 ←R ZN , v j ,u j ←R ZN , s, s j ←R ZN , r,r j ←R ZN .
This would in turn require the following change to step two (whereas step one remains intact).
aux : g1, g2, g w1 ,h1,h
w
1
ct : {g
s j w
2 , g
s j
2 , g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : hr2 , { h
r w
2 ·h
r j u j
2 , h
r j
2 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g2, g w1 ,h1,h
w
1
ct : { g
s j v j
2 , g
s j
2 , g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : hr2 , { h
r v j
2 ·h
r j u j
2 , h
r j
2 } j∈[n]
 (14)
where
w ←R ZN , v j ,u j ←R ZN , s j ←R ZN , r,r j ←R ZN .
We can justify (13) via a hybrid argument analogous to that shown in Section 3.2. See Appendix E for details.
8.2 Our Prime-order Scheme
Our prime-order construction is presented as follows:
Setup(1λ,1n): On input (1λ,1n), sample
A1 ←R Z3k×kp ,B←R Z(k+1)×kp , W,W0,W1,U0 ←R Z3k×(k+1)p , k←R Z3kp
and output the master public and secret key pair
mpk := ( [A>1 ,A>1 W,A>1 W0,A>1 W1,A>1 U0]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ) ∈Gk×3k1 × (Gk×(k+1)1 )4×GkT
and
msk := ( k, B, W, W0, W1, U0 ) .
Enc(mpk,M,m): On input a monotone span program M ∈ Zn×`′p and m ∈GT , pick c,c j ←R span(A1) for all
j ∈ [n], sample U←R Z(`
′−1)×(k+1)
p and output
ctM :=
(
C0 := [c>]1, { C1, j := [M j
(
c>U0
U
)
+c>j W]1, C2, j := [c>j ]1, C3, j := [c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1 } j∈[n], C := e([c>]1, [k]2) ·m
)
∈G3k1 × (Gk+11 ×G3k1 ×Gk+11 )n ×GT .
KeyGen(mpk,msk,x): On input an attribute vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n , pick d,d j ←R span(B) for all
j ∈ [n], and output
skx :=
(
K0 := [k+U0d]2, K1 := [d]2, { K2, j := [Wd+ (W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2 K3, j := [d j ]2 } j :x j=1
)
∈G3k2 ×Gk+12 × (G3k2 ×Gk+12 )n .
Dec(mpk,skx,ctM): If x satisfies M, compute ω1, . . . ,ωn ∈Zp such that∑
j :x j=1
ω j M j = 1.
Then, compute
K ← e(C0,K0)/
∏
j :x j=1
(
e(C1, j ,K1) ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )−1 ·e(C3, j ,K3, j )
)ω j ,
and recover the message as n ←C /K ∈GT .
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Correctness. For all M and x such that x satisfies M, we have
e(C1, j ,K1) ·e(C2, j ,K2, j )−1 ·e(C3, j ,K3, j )
=e([M j
(
c>U0
U
)
+c>j W]1, [d]2) ·e([c>j ]1, [Wd+ (W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2)−1 ·e([c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [d j ]2)
=[M j
(
c>U0d
Ud
)
]T
for all j ∈ [n]. Then we have
e(C0,K0)/
∏
j :x j=1
[M j
(
c>U0d
Ud
)
]
ω j
T =[c>k]T · [c>U0d]T /[
∑
j :x j=1
ω j M j
(
c>U0d
Ud
)
]T
=[c>k]T · [c>U0d]T /[c>U0d]T = [c>k]T .
This readily proves correctness.
8.3 Prime-order Bilinear Entropy Expansion for CP-ABE (for Monotone Span Program)
We prove the adaptive security using the following entropy expansion lemma. Let A1 ←R Z`×`1p ,A2 ←R
Z
`×`2
p ,A3 ←R Z`×`3p and A∥1 ←R Z`×`1p ,A∥2 ←R Z`×`2p ,A∥3 ←R Z`×`3p with the constraints described in Section 4.2.
Let `W ∈N.
Lemma 14 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma for CP-ABE). Suppose `1,`2,`3 ≥ k. Then, under the
MDDHk assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>j W]1, [c j ]1, [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [WD+ (W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [ c >]1,
{
[ c j
>(W+ V(2)j )]1, [ c j ]1, [ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [(W+ V(2)j )D+ (W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where W,W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp , V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D,D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c,c j ←R span(A1) in the left
distribution while c,c j ←R span(A1,A2) in the right distribution.
The lemma is proved in two steps via Lemma 9 and Lemma 15 described below. The new lemma for
the second step (i.e., Lemma 15) is adapted from Lemma 10 in an analogous way to the composite case. To
establish the lemma from MDDHk assumption, we additionally require that `2 ≥ k.
Lemma 15 (prime-order entropy expansion lemma for CP-ABE (step two)). Suppose `2 ≥ k. Then, under
the MDDHk assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
2 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1
ct :
{
[c(2)j
>
W]1, [c
(2)
j
>
]1, [c
(2)
j
>
U(2)j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [WD+U(2)j D j ]2 [D j ]2,
}
j∈[n]
≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
2 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1
ct :
{
[c(2)j
>
(W+ V(2)j )]1, [c(2)j
>
]1, [c
(2)
j
>
U(2)j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [(W+ V(2)j )D+U(2)j D j ]2 [D j ]2,
}
j∈[n]

where W←R Z`×`Wp , V(2)j ,U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D,D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c(2)j ←R span(A2).
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Proof. This follows from the MDDH`W
`2,n
assumption, which tells us that
{[s>j ]1, [s
>
j W{2}]1} j∈[n] ≈c {[s>j ]1, [s>j (W{2}+V j )]1} j∈[n]
where s j ←R Z`2p , W{2},V j ←R Z`2×`Wp . On input {[s>j ], [t>j ]} j∈[n], we select A1,A2,A3,A∥1,A∥2,A∥3, sample W{1} ←R
Z
`1×`W
p , W{3} ←R Z`3×`Wp , and implicitly define W :=A∥1W{1}+A∥2W{2}+A∥3W{3}. We then sample U j ←R Z`2×`Wp
and D,D j ←R Z`W×`Wp for all j ∈ [n], and output
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
2 ]1, [W{1}]1
ct :
{
[t j ]1, [s>j A
>
2 ]1, [s
>
j U j − t>j DD−1j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [(A
∥
1W{1}+A∥3W{3})D+A∥2U j D j ]2 [D j ]2,
}
j∈[n]
 .
Observe that
– when t>j = s>j W{2} and let c(2)j := A2s j and A∥2U j = U(2)j +A∥2W{2}DD−1j , then s>j U j − t>j DD−1j = s>j A>2 U(2)j
and the output is identical to the left distribution;
– when t>j = s>j (W{2}+V j ) and let c(2)j :=A2s j and A∥2U j =U(2)j +A∥2(W{2}+V j )DD−1j , then s>j U j − t>j DD−1j =
s>j A
>
2 U
(2)
j and the output is identical to the right distribution where we define V
(2)
j :=A∥2V j .
This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
It is easy to check that Lemma 14 is implied by Lemma 9 and Lemma 15 by the following hybrid
argument.

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[c>j W]1, [c
>
j ]1, [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [WD+ (W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 LHS in Lemma 14
A1 7→(A1,A2)≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [ c >]1,
{
[c>j W]1, [c
>
j ]1, [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [WD+ (W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 where c←R span(A1,A2) ,c j ←R span(A1)
Lemma 9≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>]1,
{
[ c j
>W]1, [ c j
>]1, [ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [WD+ (W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

where c,c j ←R span(A1,A2)
Lemma 15≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [c>],
{
[c>j (W+ V(2)j )]1, [c>j ]1, [c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D]2, [(W+ V(2)j )D+ (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

RHS in Lemma 14
8.4 Proof of Security
Theorem 3. Under the MDDHk assumption in prime-order groups (cf. Section 4.1), the unbounded CP-ABE
scheme described in this section (cf. Section 8.2) is adaptively secure (cf. Section 2.2).
The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 2, using instead the entropy expansion lemma
(Lemma 14) in this section, and the following statistical lemma:
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Lemma 16 (statistical lemma [6, Appendix A.5]). For any x that does not satisfy M, the distributions
({s,M j
( su0
u
)+ s j v j , s j } j∈[n], {α+ r u0,r,r v j } j :x j=1)
perfectly hide α, where the randomness is taken over u0, vi ,←R Zp ,u←R Z`′−1p , and for any fixed s, s j ,r 6= 0.
The proof follows the same series of games as described in Fig. 8, and we simply state the auxiliary
distributions here.
Auxiliary distributions and game sequence. We define various forms of ciphertext (for span program M
and message m):
– Normal: Generated by Enc; in particular, c,c j ←R span(A1).
– E-normal: Same as a normal ciphertext except that c,c j ←R span(A1,A2) and we use the substitution:
W 7→ V̂ j :=W+V(2)j in j ’th component and W0+ j ·W1 7→ Û j :=W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j (15)
where U(2)j ,V
(2)
j ←R spank+1(A∥2). Concretely, an E-normal ciphertext is of the form
ctM :=
(
[c>]1, { [M j
(
c>U0
U
)
+c>j V̂ j ]1, [c>j ]1, [c>j Û j ]1 } j∈[n], e([c>]1, [k]2) ·m
)
where U←R Z(`
′−1)×(k+1)
P and c,c j ←R span(A1,A2) .
Then we pick k(2) ←R span(A∥2) and define various forms of key (for attribute vector x):
– Normal: Generated by KeyGen.
– E-normal: Same as a Normal key except that we use the same substitution as in (15). Concretely, an
E-normal key is of the form
skx :=
(
[k+U0d]2, [d]2, { [ V̂ j d+ Û j d j ]2 [d j ]2 } j :x j=1
)
where d,d j ←R span(B).
– P-normal: Sample d,d j ←R Zk+1p in an E-normal key. Concretely, a P-normal key is of the form
skx :=
(
[k+U0d]2, [d]2, { [V̂ j d+ Û j d j ]2 [d j ]2 } j :x j=1
)
where d,d j ←R Zk+1p .
– P-SF: Replace k with k+ kˆ(2) in a P-normal key. Concretely, a P-SF key is of the form
skx :=
(
[k+ k(2) +U0d]2, [d]2, { [V̂ j d+ Û j d j ]2 [d j ]2 } j :x j=1
)
where d,d j ←R Zk+1p .
– SF: Sample d,d j ←R span(B) in a P-SF key. Concretely, a SF key is of the form
skx :=
(
[k+k(2)+U0d]2, [d]2, { [V̂ j d+ Û j d j ]2 [d j ]2 } j :x j=1
)
where d,d j ←R span(B) .
The game sequence and claims follow Section 7.3. We simply provide the proofs of the claims that
Game0 ≈ Game0′ and Gamei ,1 ≡ Gamei ,2: The first one follows from a revisited version of Lemma 14
(entropy expansion lemma for CP-ABE), which will change the distributions of D j (analogous to Lemma 12)
and employ parameter setting (`1,`2,`3,`W ) = (k,k,k,k + 1). This can be established from the MDDHk
assumption and Lemma 14; The second claim follows from Lemma 16 which ensures that for any x that
does not satisfy M,
( mpk︷ ︸︸ ︷
A>1 ,A
>
1 U0;
κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
k,k(2),B,U0B,V
(2)
j B;
E-normal ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{c>,M j
(
c>U0
U
)
+c>j V(2)j ,c>j } j∈[n];
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
k+U0d,d, {V(2)j d} j :x j=1
)
≡ (A>1 ,A>1 U0; k,k(2),B,U0B,V(2)j B; {c>,M j (c>U0U )+c>j V(2)j ,c>j } j∈[n]; k+ k(2) +U0d,d, {V(2)j d} j :x j=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
P-SF i ’th sk
)
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where U0 ←R Z3k×(k+1)p , V(2)j ←R spank+1(A∥2), U←R Z(`
′−1)×(k+1)
p , and for any A1, k, c, c j , k
(2), and d ∉ span(B).
It is straight-forward to compute the remaining terms in mpk, the challenge ciphertext and the Q secret keys
by sampling W,W0,W1,U
(2)
j ,d j ourselves.
9 KP-ABE for Arithmetic Span Programs
In this section, we present our adaptively secure, unbounded KP-ABE for arithmetic span programs (ASPs)
based on the k-Lin assumption in prime-order groups. Arithmetic span programs capture both boolean as
well as arithmetic formula and branching programs [15].
9.1 Definitions
We define arithmetic span programs:
Definition 2 (arithmetic span program [15]). An arithmetic span program (V,ρ) is a collection of row
vectors V= {(y j ,z j ) : j ∈ [`]} in Z`′p and ρ : [`]→ [n]. We say that
x ∈Znp satisfies (V,ρ) iff 1 ∈ span〈y j +xρ( j )z j 〉,
where 1 := (1,0, . . . ,0)> ∈Z`′p and span refers to linear span of a collection of row vectors.
That is, x satisfies (V,ρ) iff there exists constants ω1, . . . ,ω` ∈Zp such that∑`
j=1
ω j (y j +xρ( j )z j )= 1. (16)
Like in prior works [6], we need to impose a one-use restriction, that is, ρ is a permutation and ` = n. By
re-ordering the coordinates in V, we may assume WLOG that ρ is the identity map, which we omit in the
rest of this section.
9.2 Warm-Up: a Composite-Order Scheme
As a warm-up, we begin with a composite-order candidate. We build upon the “bounded” KP-ABE scheme
for arithmetic span programs in [15, 6]. Roughly speaking, we start with our unbounded KP-ABE for
monotone span programs in Section 6 and perform the following substitutions “in the exponent”:
mpk : w, w0, w1 7→ (w, w0, w1), (w ′, w ′0, w ′1)
ct : x j sw 7→ s(w +x j w ′)
s j , x j s j (w0+ j ·w1) 7→ s j , s′j , s j (w0+ j ·w1)+x j s′j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
sk : M j
(
α
u
)+ r j w 7→ y j (αu )+ r j w, z j (αu )+ r j w ′
This yields the following scheme:
mpk := (g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 , g w
′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1 ,e(g1,h123)
α) (17)
ctx := (g s1, {g
s(w+x j w ′)+s j (w0+ j w1)+x j s′j (w ′0+ j w ′1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n],e(g1,h123)
αs ·m)
skV := ({hy j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 ,h
z j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w ′
1 ,h
r j
1 ,h
r j (w0+ j w1)
1 ,h
r j (w ′0+ j w ′1)
1 } j∈[n])
To analyze this scheme, we would require the following extension to our basic entropy expansion lemma,
Lemma 2 (cf. Section 3.2), which essentially involves two parallel instances in Lemma 2, with respect to
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parameters (w, w0, w1) and (w ′, w ′0, w
′
1) respectively, bound together via common random coins s,r j :
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1, {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
sw ′+s′j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 , h
r j w
′
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 } j∈[n]

≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
sv j+s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
sw ′+s′j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
1 · g
sv ′j+s′j u′j
2 , g
s′j
1 · g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 · h
r j v j
2 , h
r j w
′
1 · h
r j v
′
j
2 , h
r j
1 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r j u j
2 , h
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 · h
r j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]

(18)
where
w, w0, w1, w
′, w ′0, w
′
1 ←R ZN , v j ,u j , v ′j ,u′j ←R ZN , s, s j , s′j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN .
We can justify (18) following the hybrid arguement in Section 3.2. See Appendix F for details. However, we
will rely on a parallel version of Lemma 3 described as follows for step one:
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s′j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
123, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 , h
r j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
123 } j∈[n]

≈c

aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
s′j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 · g
s′j u
′
j
2 , g
s′j
1 · g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j
12 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
12 · h
r j u j
2 , h
r j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
12 · h
r j u′j
2 } j∈[n]

(19)
where
w0, w1, w
′
0, w
′
1 ←R ZN , u j ,u′j ←R ZN , s j , s′j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN ,
and a similar extension of Lemma 4 described as follows for step two:
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w ′
1 ,h1,h
w
1 ,h
w ′
1
ct : g s2, {g
sw
2 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 , g
sw ′
2 · g
s′j u
′
j
2 , g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
2 , h
r j w
′
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 , h
r j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]
≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w ′
1 ,h1,h
w
1 ,h
w ′
1
ct : g s2, { g
sv j
2 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
2 , g
sv ′j
2 · g
s′j u
′
j
2 , g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : { h
r j v j
2 , h
r j v
′
j
2 , h
r j
2 , h
r j u j
2 , h
r j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]

(20)
where
w, w ′←R ZN , v j ,u j , v ′j ,u′j ←R ZN , s, s j , s′j ←R ZN , r j ←R ZN .
9.3 Our Prime-Order Construction
We present our scheme in prime-order groups:
Setup(1λ,1n): On input (1λ,1n), sample
A1 ←R Z(2k+1)×kp ,B←R Z(k+1)×kp , W,W0,W1,W′,W′0,W′1 ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p , k←R Z2k+1p
and output the master public and secret key pair
mpk := ( [A>1 ,A>1 W,A>1 W0,A>1 W1,A>1 W′,A>1 W′0,A>1 W′1]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ) ∈Gk×(2k+1)1 × (Gk×(k+1)1 )6×GkT
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and
msk := ( k, B, W, W0, W1, W′, W′0, W′1 ) .
Enc(mpk,x,m): On input an attribute vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈Znp and m ∈GT , pick c,c j ←R span(A1) for all
j ∈ [n] and output
ctx :=

C0 := [c>]1,
C1, j := [c>(W+x j ·W′)+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)+x j ·c′j>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1,
C2, j := [c>j ]1,
C ′2, j := [c′j>]1

j∈[n]
C := e([c>]1, [k]2) ·m

∈G2k+11 × (Gk+11 × (G2k+11 )2)n ×GT .
KeyGen(mpk,msk,V): On input an arithmetic span program V = {(y j ,z j )} j∈[n], pick K′ ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p ,
d j ←R span(B) for all j ∈ [n] and output
skV :=

 K0, j := [(k‖K
′)y>j +Wd j ]2,
K ′0, j := [(k‖K′)z>j +W′d j ]2,
K1, j := [d j ]2,
K2, j := [(W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2
K ′2, j := [(W′0+ j ·W′1)d j ]2

j∈[n]

∈ ((G2k+12 )2×Gk+12 × (G2k+12 )2)n .
Dec(mpk,skV,ctx): If x satisfies V, compute ω1, . . . ,ωn ∈Zp such that∑
j∈[n]
ω j (y j +x j ·z j )= 1.
Then, compute
K ← ∏
j∈[n]
(
e(C0,K0, j · (K ′0, j )x j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j ) ·e(C ′2, j , (K ′2, j )x j )
)ω j
,
and recover the message as m ←C /K ∈GT .
Correctness. For all V and x such that x satisfies V, we have
e(C0,K0, j · (K ′0, j )x j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j ) ·e(C ′2, j , (K ′2, j )x j )
=e([c>]1, [(k‖K′)(y>j +x j ·z>j )+ (W+x j ·W′)d j ]2)
·e([c>(W+x j ·W′)+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)+x j ·c′j>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1, [d j ]2)−1
·e([c>j ]1, [(W0+ j ·W1)d j ]2) ·e([c′j>]1, [x j · (W′0+ j ·W′1)d j ]2)
=

c>(k‖K′)(y>j +x j ·z>j )+c>(W+x j ·W′)d j
−c>(W+x j ·W′)d j −c>j (W0+ j ·W1)d j −x j ·c′j>(W′0+ j ·W′1)d j
c>j (W0+ j ·W1)d j +x j ·c′j>(W′0+ j ·W′1)d j

T
= [c>(k‖K′)(y>j +x j ·z>j )]T
for each j ∈ [n] and
K = ∏
j∈[n]
(
e(C0,K0, j · (K ′0, j )x j ) ·e(C1, j ,K1, j )−1 ·e(C2, j ,K2, j ) ·e(C ′2, j , (K ′2, j )x j )
)ω j
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= ∏
j∈[n]
[ω j c
>(k‖K′)(y>j +x j ·z>j )]T
=[c>(k‖K′) ∑
j∈[n]
ω j (y
>
j +x j ·z>j )]T
=[c>(k‖K′)1>]T = [c>k]T = e([c>]1, [k]2).
This readily proves correctness.
9.4 Bilinear Entropy Expansion Lemma
To prove the adaptive security of our unbounded KP-ABE scheme for arithmetic span programs, we require
the following variant of Lemma 8, the prime-order entropy expansion lemma for our unbounded KP-ABE
for boolean span program (cf. Section 5).
Lemma 17 (entropy expansion lemma for ASPs). Define bases A1,A2,A3,A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3 as in Section 4.2. Suppose
`1,`3,`W ≥ k. Then, under the MDDHk assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′]1, [A>1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1
ct : [c>]1,
 [c
>W+c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
[c>W′+c′j>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1, [c′j>]1

j∈[n]
sk :
 [WD j ]2,[W′D j ]2, [D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1)D j ]2

j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′]1, [A>1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1
ct : [ c >]1,

[ c >(W+ V(2)j )+ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
[ c >(W′+ V′(2)j )+ c′j
>
(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )]1, [ c′j
>
]1

j∈[n]
sk :

[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2,
[(W′+ V′(2)j )D j ]2,
[D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )D j ]2

j∈[n]

where W,W0,W1,W′,W′0,W
′
1 ←R Z`×`Wp , V(2)j ,U(2)j ,V′(2)j ,U′(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c,c j ,c′j ←R
span(A1) in the left distribution while c,c j ,c′j ←R span(A1,A2) in the right distribution.
One can prove Lemma 17 via a hybrid argument analogous to that in Section 5: the support of c is
changed from span(A1) to span(A1,A2), and then Lemma 18 (for step one) and Lemma 19 (for step two)
described as follows are applied successively.
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Lemma 18 (entropy expansion lemma for ASPs (step one)). Suppose `1,`3 ≥ k. Then, under the MDDHk
assumption, we have 
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1, [A
>
2 ]
ct :
 [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
[c′j
>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1, [c′j>]1

j∈[n]
sk :
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2[(W′0+ j ·W′1)D j ]2

j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1, [A
>
2 ]
ct :

[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
[ c′j
>
(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )]1, [ c′j
>
]1

j∈[n]
sk :
[D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )D j ]2

j∈[n]

where W0,W1,W′0,W
′
1 ←R Z`×`Wp , U(2)j ,U′(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c j ,c′j ←R span(A1) in the left
distribution while c j ,c′j ←R span(A1,A2) in the right distribution.
Lemma 19 (entropy expansion lemma for ASPs (step two)). Suppose `W ≥ k. Then, under the MDDHk
assumption, we have
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W
′]1
ct : [c(2)
>
]1,
 [c
(2)>W+c(2)j
>
U(2)j ]1, [c
(2)
j
>
]1
[c(2)
>
W′+c′(2)j
>
U′(2)j ]1, [c
′(2)
j
>
]1

j∈[n]
sk :
 [WD j ]2,[W′D j ]2, [D j ]2,
[U(2)j D j ]2
[U′(2)j D j ]2

j∈[n]

≈c

aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W
′]1
ct : [c(2)
>
]1,

[c(2)
>
(W+ V(2)j )+c(2)j
>
U(2)j ]1, [c
(2)
j
>
]1
[c(2)
>
(W′+ V′(2)j )+c′(2)j
>
U′(2)j ]1, [c
′(2)
j
>
]1

j∈[n]
sk :

[(W+ V(2)j )D j ]2,
[(W′+ V′(2)j )D j ]2,
[D j ]2,
[U(2)j D j ]2
[U′(2)j D j ]2

j∈[n]

where W,W′←R Z`×`Wp , V(2)j ,U(2)j ,V′(2)j ,U′(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2), D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , and c(2),c(2)j ,c′(2)j ←R span(A2).
Proving Lemma 18 and Lemma 19. Before we proceed, we develop a parallel variant of the DDHG2A1
assumption (cf. Section 4), which is denoted by pDDHG2A1 .
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Lemma 20 (MDDH2`1
`W ,Q
⇒ pDDHG2A1 ). Fix Q = poly(λ) with Q > `W ≥ 1. Under the MDDH
2`1
`W ,Q
assumption
in G2, the following advantage function is negligible in λ
Adv
DDHG2A1
A
(λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0 = 1]−Pr[A(D,T1)= 1] |
where
D := ( A1,A2,A3,A‖1,A‖2,A‖3; A>2 W,A>3 W,A>2 W′,A>3 W′ ), W,W′←R Z`×`Wp ;
T0 := ([WD]2, [W′D]2[D]2), T1 := ([WD+R(1)]2, [W′D+R′(1)]2, [D]2), D←R Z`W×Qp , R(1),R′(1) ←R spanQ (A‖1).
Proof. We prove the lemma from
([D]2, [SD]2, [S
′D]2)≈c ([D]2, [SD+U]2, [S′D+U′]2)
where D ←R Z`W×Qp , S,S′←R Z`1×`Wp and U,U′←R Z`1×Qp , which is implied by the MDDH2`1`W ,Q assumption.
On input ([D]2, [T]2, [T′]2), algorithmB samples A1,A2,A3,A‖1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3, pick W˜,W˜
′←R Z`×`Wp , and implicitly set
W := W˜+A∥1S, W′ := W˜′+A∥1S′. Output
A1,A2,A3,A
‖
1,A
‖
2,A
‖
3; A
>
2 W˜,A
>
3 W˜,A
>
2 W˜
′,A>3 W˜
′,
[W˜D+A‖1T]2, [W˜′D+A‖1T′]2, [D]2.
Observe that when T = SD and T′ = S′D, the output is identical to (D,T0); and when T = SD+U and T′ =
S′D+U′, the output is identical to (D,T1) if we set R(1) := A∥1U and R′(1) := A∥1U′. This readily proves the
lemma. uunionsq
It is not hard to see that the proof of Lemma 19 is completely analogous to that of Lemma 10 using the
pDDHG2A2 assumption instead of the basic DDH
G2
A2
assumption, while Lemma 18 can be proved using the
following game sequence, which is analogous to that shown in Section 5.1 for proving Lemma 9.
Game0. The adversaryA is given the left distribution in Lemma 18.
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1, [A
>
2 ]
ct :
 [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
[c′j
>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1, [c′j>]1

j∈[n]
sk :
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1)D j ]2[(W′0+ j ·W′1)D j ]2

j∈[n]

.
Game0′ . We modify the distribution of sk as follows:
sk :
 [D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )D j ]2

j∈[n]
where U(2)1 , . . . ,U
(2)
n ,U
′(2)
1 , . . . ,U
′(2)
n ←R span`W (A∥2). We claim that Game0 ≈c Game0′ . This follows from the
pDDHG2A2 assumption which tells us that{
[D j ]2, [W0D j ]2, [W
′
0D j ]2
}
j∈[n] ≈c
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+U(2)j )D j ]2, [(W′0+U′(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
given A>1 ,A
>
1 W0,A
>
1 W
′
0. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 30.
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Gamei (i = 1, . . . ,n+1). We change the distribution of ct:
ct :


[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
[ c′j
>
(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )]1, [ c′j
>
]1

j<i
,
 [c
>
j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
[c′j
>(W′0+ j ·W′1)]1, [c′j>]1

j≥i

where c j ,c
′
j ←R span(A1,A2) for j < i and c j ,c′j ←R span(A1) for all remaining j ≥ i . It is easy to see that
Game0′ ≡Game1. To show that Gamei ≈c Gamei+1, we will require another sequence of sub-games.
Sub-Gamei ,1. Identical to Gamei except that we modify cti as follows:
cti :
[ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1)]1, [ ci >]1
[ c′i
>
(W′0+ i ·W′1)]1, [ c′i
>
]1
where ci ,c
′
i ←R span(A1,A3) . We claim that Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1. This follows from
[ci ,c
′
i ←R span(A1)]1 ≈c [ci ,c′i ←R span(A1,A3)]1 given [A1,A2]1,basis(A∥2)
which is ensured by the SDG1A1 7→A1,A3 assumption. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 31.
Sub-Gamei ,2. We modify the distributions of all sk j with j 6= i (while keeping ski unchanged):
sk j ( j 6= i ) : [D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j + U(3)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+U′(2)j + U′(3)j )D j ]2
where U(3)j ,U
′(3)
j ←R span`W (A∥3). We claim that Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2. This follows from pDDHG2A3 ,
which tells us that{
[D j ]2, [W1D j ]2, [W
′
1D j ]2
}
j 6=i ≈c
{
[D j ]2, [(W1+ U˜(3)j )D j ]2, [(W′1+ U˜′(3)j )D j ]2
}
j 6=i
given A1,A2,A3,A
∥
2,A
>
1 W1,A
>
2 W1,A
>
1 W
′
1,A
>
2 W
′
1, where U˜
(3)
j ,U˜
′(3)
j ←R span`W (A∥3). The proof is analogous to
that of Lemma 32.
Sub-Gamei ,3. We modify the distributions of cti and ski :
cti :

[c>i (W0+ i ·W1+ U(2)i +U(3)i )]1, [c>i ]1
[c′i
>(W′0+ i ·W′1+ U′(2)i +U′(3)i )]1, [c′i>]1

ski :
[Di ]2,
[(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i + U(3)i )Di ]2
[(W′0+ i ·W′1+U′(2)i + U′(3)i )Di ]2

where U(3)i ,U
′(3)
i ←R span`W (A∥3). We claim that Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,3. This follows from the following
statistical argument:A>1 W0,A>2 W0 W0,
{
W0+U(3)j
}
j 6=i
A>1 W
′
0,A
>
2 W
′
0 W
′
0,
{
W′0+U′(3)j
}
j 6=i
≡
A>1 W0,A>2 W0 W0+ U(3)i ,
{
W0+U(3)j
}
j 6=i
A>1 W
′
0,A
>
2 W
′
0 W
′
0+ U′(3)i ,
{
W′0+U′(3)j
}
j 6=i

and U(2)i , U
′(2)
i in cti are introduced “for free”. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 33.
45
Sub-Gamei ,4. We modify the distribution of cti :
cti :
[ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i +U(3)i )]1, [ ci
>]1
[ c′i
>
(W′0+ i ·W′1+U
′(2)
i +U
′(3)
i )]1, [ c
′
i
>
]1
where ci ,c
′
i ←R span(A1,A2,A3) .
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,3 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,4. This follows from SDG1A3 7→A3,A2 which tells us that
[ci ,c
′
i ←R span(A3)]1 ≈c [ci ,c′i ←R span(A3,A2)]1 given [A2,A1]1,basis(A∥2,A∥3).
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 34, where we independently sample (U(2)j +U(3)j ) and (U′(2)j +U′(3)j )
using basis(A∥2,A
∥
3) for all j ∈ [n].
Sub-Gamei ,5. We change the distributions of cti and ski :
cti :
 [c
>
i (W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i + 
 U(3)i )]1, [c
>
i ]1
[c′i
>(W′0+ i ·W′1+U′(2)i +U
′(3)
i )]1, [c
′
i
>]1

ski :
[Di ]2, [(W0+ i ·W1+U
(2)
i + 
 U(3)i )Di ]2
[(W′0+ i ·W′1+U′(2)i +U
′(3)
i )Di ]2

We claim that Sub-Gamei ,4 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,5. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡
Sub-Gamei ,3.
Sub-Gamei ,6. We change the distributions of all sk j with j 6= i :
sk j ( j 6= i ) : [D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j + 
 U(3)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+U′(2)j + 
 U′(3)j )D j ]2
We claim that Sub-Gamei ,5 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,6. The proof is completely analogous to that of Sub-Gamei ,1 ≡
Sub-Gamei ,2.
Sub-Gamei ,7. We change the distribution of cti :
cti :
[ ci
>(W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i )]1, [ ci
>]1
[ c′i
>
(W′0+ i ·W′1+U′(2)i )]1, [ c′i
>
]1
where ci ,c
′
i ←R span(A1,A2) . We claim that Sub-Gamei ,6 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,7. The proof is completely analo-
gous to that of Gamei ≡ Sub-Gamei ,1.
Gamen+1. In Gamen+1, we have:
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
1 W
′
0]1, [A
>
1 W
′
1]1, [A
>
2 ]
ct :

[ c j
>(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )]1, [ c j
>]1
[ c′j
>
(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )]1, [ c′j
>
]1

j∈[n]
sk :
[D j ]2,
[(W0+ j ·W1+ U(2)j )D j ]2
[(W′0+ j ·W′1+ U′(2)j )D j ]2

j∈[n]

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where c j ,c′j ←R span(A1,A2) and U(2)j ,U′(2)j ←R span`W (A2) for all j ∈ [n]. This is exactly the right distribution
of Lemma 18.
9.5 Proof of Security
Theorem 4. Under the MDDHk assumption in prime-order groups (cf. Section 4.1), the unbounded KP-
ABE scheme for arithmetic span programs described in this section (cf. Section 9.3) is adaptively secure
(cf. Section 2.2).
The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 2, using instead the entropy expansion lemma
(Lemma 17) in this section, and the following statistical lemma:
Lemma 21 (statistical lemma [6, Appendix A.6]). For any x that does not satisfy V = {(y j ,z j )} j∈[n], the
distributions ({
v j +x j v ′j
}
j∈[n],
{
y j
(
α
u
)+ r j v j , z j (αu )+ r j v ′j , r j } j∈[n])
perfectly hide α, where the randomness is taken over v j , v ′j ←R Zp ,u←R Z`
′−1
p , and for any fixed r j 6= 0.
The proof follows the same series of games as described in Fig. 8, and we simply state the auxiliary
distributions here.
Auxiliary distributions. We define various forms of ciphertext (of attribute vector x and message m):
– Normal: Generated by Enc; in particular, c,c j ,c′j ←R span(A1).
– E-normal: Same as a normal ciphertext except that c,c j ,c′j ←R span(A1,a2) and we use the substitution:
W 7→ V̂ j :=W+V(2)j
W′ 7→ V̂′j :=W′+V′(2)j
in j ’th component and
W0+ j ·W1 7→ Û j :=W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j
W′0+ j ·W′1 7→ Û′j :=W′0+ j ·W′1+U′(2)j
(21)
where U(2)j ,V
(2)
j ,U
′(2)
j ,V
′(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2). Concretely, an E-normal ciphertext is of the form
ctx :=
(
[c>]1,
{
[c> V̂ j +x j ·c> V̂′j +c>j Û j +x j ·c′j> Û′j ]1, [c>j ]1, [c′j>]1
}
j∈[n], e([c
>]1, [k]2) ·m
)
where c,c j ,c
′
j ←R span(A1,a2) .
Then we pick α←R Zp and define various forms of key (for span program M):
– Normal: Generated by KeyGen.
– E-normal: Same as a normal key except that we use the same substitution as in (21). Concretely, a E-
normal key is of the form
skV :=


[(k‖K′)y>j + V̂ j d j ]2,
[(k‖K′)z>j + V̂′j d j ]2,
[d j ]2,
[ Û j d j ]2
[ Û′j d j ]2

j∈[n]
 where d j ←R span(B), K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`′−1)p .
– P-normal: Sample d j ←R Zk+1p in an E-normal key. Concretely, a P-normal key is of the form
skV :=

 [(k‖K
′)y>j + V̂ j d j ]2,
[(k‖K′)z>j + V̂′j d j ]2,
[d j ]2,
[Û j d j ]2
[Û′j d j ]2

j∈[n]
 where d j ←R Zk+1p , K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`′−1)p .
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– P-SF: Replace k with k+αa∥2 in a P-normal key. Concretely, a P-SF key is of the form
skV :=


[(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)y>j + V̂ j d j ]2,
[(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)z>j + V̂′j d j ]2,
[d j ]2,
[Û j d j ]2
[Û′j d j ]2

j∈[n]
 where d j ←R Zk+1p , K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`′−1)p .
– SF: Sample d j ←R span(B) in a P-SF key. Concretely, a SF key is of the form
skV :=

 [(k+αa
∥
2‖K′)y>j + V̂ j d j ]2,
[(k+αa∥2‖K′)z>j + V̂′j d j ]2,
[d j ]2,
[Û j d j ]2
[Û′j d j ]2

j∈[n]
 where d j ←R span(B) , K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`′−1)p .
The game sequence and claims follow Section 7.3. We simply provide the proofs of the claims that
Game0 ≈Game0′ andGamei ,1 ≡Gamei ,2: The first one follows from a revisited version of Lemma 17 (entropy
expansion lemma for KP-ABE for ASPs), which will change the distributions of D j (analogous to Lemma 12)
and employ parameter setting (`1,`2,`3,`W ) = (k,k,k,k + 1). This can be established from the MDDHk
assumption and Lemma 17; The second claim follows from Lemma 21 which ensures that for any x that
does not satisfy M,
( κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
k,α,B,V(2)j B,V
′(2)
j B;
E-normal ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{V(2)j +x j ·V′(2)j } j∈[n],
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(k‖K′)y>j +V(2)j d j , (k‖K′)z>j +V′(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]
)
≡ (k,α,B,V(2)j B,V′(2)j B; {V(2)j +x j ·V′(2)j } j∈[n], {(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)y>j +V(2)j d j , (k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)z>j +V′(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P-SF i ’th sk
)
where K′ ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p ,V
(2)
j ,V
′(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2), and for any k,α,B and d j ∉ span(B). It is straight-
forward to compute the remaining terms in mpk, the challenge ciphertext and the Q secret keys by sampling
A1,W,W0,W1,W′,W′0,W
′
1,U
(2)
j ,U
′(2)
j ,c,c j ,c
′
j ,d j ourselves.
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Appendix
A Additional claims for Section 3.3
Fixing an adversaryA, we use Advxx to denote the advantage ofA in Gamexx .
Lemma 22 (Game0 ≈c Game0′). There existsB0 with Time(A)≈Time(B0) such that
|Adv0−Adv0′ | ≤AdvDDH
HN
p2
B0
(λ).
Proof. This follows from
{h
r j
2 ,h
r j w0
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 , h
r j u′j
2 } j∈[n] given g1, g2,h13
where u′j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and h13 is a random generator of Hp1p3 , which is implied by the DDHHNp2
assumption. On input {h
r j
2 ,T j } j∈[n] along with g1, g2,h13, algorithm B0 samples w˜0, w1 ←R ZN as well as
s j , r˜ j ←R ZN , and outputs 
aux : g1, g
w˜0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w˜0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r˜ j
13 ·h
r j
2 , h
r˜ j (w˜0+ j ·w1)
13 ·T j · (h
r j
2 )
j ·w1 } j∈[n]
 .
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have that
(g w01 , {h
r j
13,h
r j w0
13 } j∈[n], {h
r j
2 ,h
r j w0
2 } j∈[n])≡ (g w˜01 , {h
r˜ j
13,h
r˜ j w˜0
13 } j∈[n], {h
r j
2 ,h
r j w0
2 } j∈[n])
where r j , w0, r˜ j , w˜0 ←R ZN . Observe that when T j = hr j w02 the output is identical to Game0; and when T j =
h
r j u′j
2 and let u j = u′j + j ·w1, the output is identical to Game0′ . This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 23 (Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1). There existsB1 with Time(A)≈Time(B1) such that
|Advi −Advi ,1| ≤AdvSD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3
B1
(λ).
Proof. Recall that the SDGNp1 7→p1p3 assumption asserts that
g si1 ≈c g si1 · g si3 given g1, g2,h13,h2.
On input T along with g1, g2,h13,h2, algorithm B1 samples w0, w1,u j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] as well as s j ←R
ZN for j ∈ [n] \ {i }, and outputs 
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j<i
{T w0+i ·w1 , T }
{g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j>i
sk : {h
r j
13 ·h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 ·h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n]

.
Observe that when T = g si1 the output is identical to Gamei ; and when T = g si1 ·g si3 , the output is identical to
Sub-Gamei ,1. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
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Lemma 24 (Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2). There existsB2 with Time(A)≈Time(B2) such that
|Advi ,1−Advi ,2| ≤AdvDDH
HN
p3
B2
(λ).
Proof. This follows from
{h
r j
3 ,h
r j w1
3 } j 6=i ≈c {h
r j
3 , h
r j u′j
3 } j 6=i given g1, g2, g3,h1,h2,h3,
where u′j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n], which is implied by the DDHHNp3 assumption. On input {h
r j
3 ,T j } j 6=i , algorithm
B1 samples w˜0, w˜1,u j , s j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and programs
w0 := w˜0 mod p1p2, w0 := w˜0− i ·w1 mod p3,
and outputs 
aux : g1, g
w˜0
1 , g
w˜1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w˜0+ j ·w˜1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j<i
{g si (w˜0+i ·w˜1)1 · g si w˜03 , g si1 · g si3 }
{g
s j (w˜0+ j ·w˜1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j>i
sk : {h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 , h
r j (w˜0+ j ·w˜1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 ·h
r j w˜0
3 ·T
j−i
j } j 6=i
{hri1 ·hri2 ·hri3 , hri (w˜0+i ·w˜1)1 ·hri ui2 ·hri w˜03 }

.
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have (g w11 ,h
w1
1 ,h
w1
3 )≡ (g w˜11 ,hw˜11 ,hw13 ) where w˜1, w1 ←R ZN . Observe
that when T j = g r j w13 the output is identical to Sub-Gamei ,1; and when T j = g
r j u′j
3 and if we re-define u j =
w˜0+ ( j − i ) ·u′j mod p3 for j 6= i , the output is identical Sub-Gamei ,2. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 25 (Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,3). Advi ,2 ≡Advi ,3.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that
(
ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
aux︷ ︸︸ ︷
g w01 , g
w1
1 ; {g
u j
2 } j<i , g
w0+i ·w1
3 ;
sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
hw01 ,h
w1
1 , {h
u j
2 } j∈[n], {h
u j
3 } j 6=i ,h
w0+i ·w1
3 )
≡( g w01 , g w11 ; {g
u j
2 } j<i , g
ui
3 ; h
w0
1 ,h
w1
1 , {h
u j
2 } j∈[n], {h
u j
3 } j 6=i , h
ui
3 )
where w0, w1,u j ←R ZN . It is direct to see that this is implied by the following statement
(w0 mod p1, w1 mod p1, {u j mod p2} j∈[n], {u j mod p3} j 6=i , w0+ i ·w1 mod p3)
≡(w0 mod p1, w1 mod p1, {u j mod p2} j∈[n], {u j mod p3} j 6=i , ui mod p3 )
where w0, w1,u j ←R ZN , which follows from the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the fact that {w0 + i ·
w1 mod p3}≡ {ui mod p3} when w0, w1,ui mod p3 are uniformly distributed over Zp3 . This completes the
proof. uunionsq
Lemma 26 (Sub-Gamei ,3 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,4). There existsB4 with Time(A)≈Time(B4) such that
|Advi ,3−Advi ,4| ≤AdvSD
GN
p3 7→p3 p2
B4
(λ).
Proof. Recall that the SDGNp3 7→p3p2 assumption asserts that
g si3 ≈c g si2 · g si3 given g1, g2,h1,h23.
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On input T , algorithmB4 samples w0, w1,u j ,r j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n], s j for all j ∈ [n]\{i } and s˜i ←R ZN , and
outputs 
aux : g1, g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g2
ct : {g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 } j<i
{g s˜i (w0+i ·w1)1 ·T u j , g s˜i1 ·T }
{g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 } j>i
sk : {h
r j
1 ·h
r j
23, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
23 } j∈[n]

.
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have (g si1 , g
si
2 , g
si
3 ) ≡ (g s˜i1 , g si2 , g si3 ) where si , s˜i ←R ZN . Observe that
when T = g si3 the output is identical to Sub-Gamei ,3; and when T = g si2 · g si3 , the output is identical to
Sub-Gamei ,4. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 27 (Sub-Gamei ,4 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,5). Advi ,4 =Advi ,5.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 25 (Sub-Gamei ,2 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,3).
Lemma 28 (Sub-Gamei ,5 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,6). There existsB6 with Time(A)≈Time(B6) such that
|Advi ,5−Advi ,6| ≤AdvDDH
HN
p3
B6
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 24 (Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2), except we
simulate cti as follows
cti : g
si (w˜0+i ·w˜1)
1 · g si ui2 · g si w˜03 , g si1 · g si2 · g si3
where g2 and ui are known to the simulator. uunionsq
Lemma 29 (Sub-Gamei ,6 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,7). There existsB7 with Time(A)≈Time(B7) such that
|Advi ,6−Advi ,7| ≤AdvSD
GN
p1 7→p1 p3
B7
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 23 (Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1), except we generate
cti as follows
cti : T
w0+i ·w1 · g s˜i ui2 , T · g s˜i2
where g2 and ui are known to the simulator and s˜i ←R ZN . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have
(g si1 , g
si
2 , g
si
3 )≡ (g si1 , g s˜i2 , g si3 ) where si , s˜i ←R ZN . uunionsq
B Additional claims for Section 5.1
Fix an adversaryA, we use Advxx to denote the advantage ofA in Gamexx .
Lemma 30 (Game0 ≈c Game0′). There exists an adversaryB0 with Time(A)≈Time(B0) such that
|Adv0−Adv0′ | ≤Adv
DDHG2A2
B0
(λ).
Proof. This basically follows DDHG2A2 assumption which asserts that
{[W0D j ]2, [D j ]2} j∈[n] ≈c {[(W0+U(2)j )D j ]2, [D j ]2} j∈[n] given A1,A2,A>1 W0
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where W0 ←R Z`×`Wp , D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2). On input {[T j ]2, [D j ]2} j∈[n] along with A1,A2,A>1 W0,
algorithmB0 samples W1 ←R Z`×`Wp , s j ←R Z`1p for all j ∈ [n] and outputs
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[s>j (A
>
1 W0+ j ·A>1 W1)]1, [s>j A>1 ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [T j + j ·W1D j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 .
Observe that when T j =W0D j , the output is identical to Game0; and when T j = (W0+U(2)j )D j , the output is
identical to Game0′ . This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 31 (Gamei ≈ Sub-Gamei ,1). For any adversary A, there exists an adversary B1 with Time(A) ≈
Time(B1) such that
|Advi −Advi ,1| ≤Adv
SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A3
B1
(λ).
Proof. Recall that the SDG1A1 7→A1,A3 assumption asserts
[t←R span(A1)]1 ≈c [t←R span(A1,A3)]1 given [A1,A2]1,basis(A∥2).
On input [t]1 along with [A1,A2]1,basis(A
∥
2), algorithm B1 samples W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp , D j ←R Z`W×`Wp for all
j ∈ [n] and U(2)j ←R span`W (A∥2) for j ∈ [n] using basis(A∥2), and outputs
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )]1, [c>j ]1
}
j<i c j ←R span(A1,A2){
[t>(W0+ i ·W1)]1, [t>]1
}
{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j>i c j ←R span(A1)
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

.
Observe that when t ←R span(A1) the output is identical to that in Gamei ; and when t ←R span(A1,A3), the
output is identical to that in Sub-Gamei ,1. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 32 (Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈ Sub-Gamei ,2). There exists an adversaryB2 with Time(A)≈Time(B2) such that
|Advi ,1−Advi ,2| ≤Adv
DDHG2A3
B2
(λ).
Proof. This follows the DDHG2A3 assumption asserting that
{ [D j ]2, [W1D j ]2 } j 6=i ≈c { [D j ]2, [(W1+ U˜(3)j )D j ]2 } j 6=i given A1,A2,A3,A∥2,A>1 W1,A>2 W1
where U˜(3)j ←R span`W (A∥3). On input {[D j ]2, [T j ]2} j 6=i along with A1,A2,A3,A∥2,A>1 W1,A>2 W1, algorithm B2
samples W˜0 and programs W0 := W˜0 − i ·W1, samples s1, j ←R Z`1p , s2, j ←R Z`2p , D j ←R Z`W×`Wp , U(2)j ←R
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span`W (A∥2) for all j ∈ [n], and outputs
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W˜0− i ·A>1 W1]1, [A>1 W1]1, [A>2 ]1
ct :
{
[c>j (W˜0+U(2)j )+ ( j − i ) · (s>1, j A>1 W1+s>2, j A>2 W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j<i c j :=A1s1, j +A2s2, j{
[c>i W˜0]1, [c
>
i ]1
}
ci ←R span(A1,A3){
[s>1, j A
>
1 W˜0+ ( j − i ) ·s>1, j A>1 W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j>i c j :=A1s1, j
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W˜0+U(2)j )D j + ( j − i ) ·T j ]2
}
j 6=i{
[Di ]2, [(W˜0+U(2)i )Di ]2
}

.
Observe that when T j =W1D j , the output is identical to Sub-Gamei ,1; and when T j = (W1+ U˜(3)j )D j and let
U(3)j := ( j − i ) · U˜(3)j , the output is identical to Sub-Gamei ,2. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 33 (Sub-Gamei ,2 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,3). Advi ,2 =Advi ,3.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that, for A1,A2,A3,A
∥
1,A
∥
2,A
∥
3, we have
(
aux,{ct j } j 6=i︷ ︸︸ ︷
A>1 W0,A
>
2 W0,
{sk j } j 6=i︷ ︸︸ ︷
{W0+U(3)j } j 6=i ,
cti ,ski︷︸︸︷
W0 )≡ (A>1 W0,A>2 W0, {W0+U(3)j } j 6=i ,W0+ U(3)i )
where W0 ←R Z`×`Wp and U(3)j ←R span`W (A∥3) for all j ∈ [n]. This is further implied by
(A>1 W0,A
>
2 W0,W0)≡ (A>1 W0,A>2 W0,W0+ U(3)i )
which is described by the statistical lemma, Lemma 5. uunionsq
Lemma 34 (Sub-Gamei ,3 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,4). There exists an adversaryB4 withTime(B4)≈Time(A) such that
|Advi ,3−Advi ,4| ≤Adv
SDG1A3 7→A3 ,A2
B4
(λ).
Proof. Recall that the SDG1A3 7→A3,A2 assumption asserts that
[t←R span(A3)]1 ≈c [t←R span(A3,A2)]1 given [A2,A1]1,basis(A∥2,A∥3).
On input [t]1 along with [A2,A1]1,basis(A
∥
2,A
∥
3), algorithmB4 samples W0,W1 ←R Z`×`Wp and
(U(2)j +U(3)j =) U(23)j ←R span`W (A∥2,A∥3)
for j ∈ [n] using basis(A∥2,A∥3), and outputs
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1, [A
>
2 ]1
ct :
{
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(23)j )]1, [c>j ]1
}
j<i c j ←R span(A1,A2){
[c>i (W0+ i ·W1+U(23)i )]1, [c>i ]1
}
ci ←R t+ span(A1){
[c>j (W0+ j ·W1)]1, [c>j ]1
}
j>i c j ←R span(A1)
sk :
{
[D j ]2, [(W0+ j ·W1+U(23)j )D j ]2
}
j∈[n]

.
Observe that when t←R span(A3) the output is identical to that in Sub-Gamei ,3; and when t←R span(A2,A3),
the output is identical to that in Sub-Gamei ,4. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
54
Lemma 35 (Sub-Gamei ,4 ≡ Sub-Gamei ,5). Advi ,4 =Advi ,5.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 33 (Sub-Gamei ,2 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,3). uunionsq
Lemma 36 (Sub-Gamei ,5 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,6). There exists an adversaryB6 withTime(A)≈Time(B6) such that
|Advi ,5−Advi ,6| ≤Adv
DDHG2A3
B6
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 32 (Sub-Gamei ,1 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,2) except that
we simulate
ski : [c
>
i (W˜0+U(2)i )]1, [c>i ]1
where ci ←R Z`p and U(2)i are known to the simulator. uunionsq
Lemma 37 (Sub-Gamei ,6 ≈c Sub-Gamei ,7). There exists an adversaryB7 withTime(A)≈Time(B7) such that
|Advi ,6−Advi ,7| ≤Adv
SDG1A1 7→A1 ,A3
B7
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 31 (Gamei ≈c Sub-Gamei ,1) except that we
simulate
ski : [c
>
i (W0+ i ·W1+U(2)i )]1, [c>i ]1
where W0,W1,U
(2)
i are known to the simulator and ci ←R t+ span(A2). uunionsq
C Missing Lemmas for Section 6.2
Fix an adversaryA that makes at most Q key queries, we useAdvxx to denote the advantage ofA inGamexx .
Lemma 38 (Game0 ≈c Game0′). There exists an adversaryB0 with Time(B0)≈Time(A) such that
|Adv0−Adv0′ | ≤AdvEXPLEMB0 (λ).
Proof. This follows from the entropy expansion lemma (see Lemma 2). On input
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : C0, {C1, j , C2, j } j∈[n]
sk : {K0, j , K1, j , K2, j } j∈[n]
 ,
algorithmB0 proceeds as follows:
Setup. Select a random generator h123 of HN and sample α←R ZN . Choose a pairwise independent hash
function H : GT → {0,1}λ and output
mpk := ( aux, e(g1,h123)α;H ).
Key Queries. For each query M, sample u←R Z`′−1N and r˜ j ←R ZN for j ∈ [n], and output
skM := ( { hM j
(α
u
)
123 ·K
r˜ j
0, j , K
r˜ j
1, j , K
r˜ j
2, j } j∈[n] ).
Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1} and output
ctx∗ := ( C0, { C1, j , C2, j } j :x∗j =1,e(C0,h
α
123) ·mb ).
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Guess. WhenA halts with output b′,B0 outputs 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that when the input is identical to the left distribution in Lemma 2, the output is identical toGame0;
and when the input is identical to the right distribution in Lemma 2, the output is identical to Game0′ . This
readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 39 (Game0′ ≈Game1). There exists an adversaryB1 with Time(B1)≈Time(A) such that
|Adv0′ −Adv1| ≤AdvSD
GN
p2 7→p2 p3
B1
(λ).
Proof. This follows from
( g s2, {g
s j
2 } j∈[n] )≈c ( g s2 · g s3 , {g
s j
2 · g
s j
3 } j∈[n] ) given g1,h1,h2.
which is implied by the SDGNp2 7→p2p3 assumption. On input (T, {T j } j∈[n]) along with g1,h1,h2, algorithm B1
picks v j ,u j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and proceeds as follows:
Setup. Select a random generator h123 for HN and sample α, w, w0, w1 ←R ZN . Choose a pairwise indepen-
dent hash function H : GT → {0,1}λ and output
mpk := ( g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 , e(g1,h123)α; H ).
Key Queries. For each query M, sample u←R Z`′−1N and r j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
skM := ( { hM j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 ·h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n] ).
Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1}, s˜, s˜ j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
ctx∗ :=
(
g s˜1 ·T, { g
s˜w+s˜ j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·T v j ·T
u j
j , g
s˜ j
1 ·T j } j :x∗j =1, H(e(g
s˜
1 ·T,hα123)) ·mb
)
.
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′,B1 outputs 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that when T = g s2 and T j = g
s j
2 , the output is identical to Game0′ ; and when T = g s2 · g s3 and T j =
g
s j
2 · g
s j
3 , the output is identical to Game1. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 40 (Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1). There exists an adversaryB2 with Time(B2)≈Time(A) such that
|Advi −Advi ,1| ≤AdvSD
HN
p2 7→p2 p3
B2
(λ).
Proof. This follows from
{h
r j
2 } j∈[n] ≈c {h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 } j∈[n] given g1, g23,h1,h2,h3
where g23 is a random generator of Gp2p3 , which is implied by SD
HN
p2 7→p2p3 assumption. On input {T j } j∈[n]
along with g1, g23,h1,h2,h3, algorithmB2 samples v j ,u j , αˆ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and proceeds as follows:
Setup. Select a random generator h123 of HN and sample α, w, w0, w1,←R ZN . Choose a pairwise indepen-
dent hash function H : GT → {0,1}λ and output
mpk := ( g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 , e(g1,h123)α; H ).
Key Queries. For the κ’s query M, sample u←R Z`′−1N and r˜ j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
skM :=

( { h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r˜ j w
1 ·h
r˜ j v j
2 , h
r˜ j
1 ·h
r˜ j
2 , h
r˜ j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r˜ j u j
2 } j∈[n] ) if κ< i
( { h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r˜ j w
1 ·T
v j
j , h
r˜ j
1 ·T j , h
r˜ j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·T
u j
j } j∈[n] ) if κ= i
( { h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r˜ j w
1 ·h
r˜ j v j
2 , h
r˜ j
1 ·h
r˜ j
2 , h
r˜ j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r˜ j u j
2 } j∈[n] ) if κ> i
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Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1}, s, s j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
ctx∗ :=
(
g s1 · g s23, { g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
sv j+s j u j
23 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
23 } j :x∗j =1, H(e(g
s
1 · g s23,hα123)) ·mb
)
.
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′,B2 outputs 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that when T j = hr j2 , the output is identical to Gamei ; and when T j = h
r j
2 ·h
r j
3 , the output is identical
to Gamei ,1. This readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 41 (Gamei ,1 ≡Gamei ,2). Advi ,1 =Advi ,2.
Proof. Fix generators g1, g2, g3,h123,h1,h2,h3, common parameters w, w0, w1, {u j } j∈[n], and all random
coins except those for the i ’th key. It is sufficient to prove that, for all α, αˆ and all r j 6= 0 mod p3, we have
(
κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
{h
v j
2 } j∈[n] ;
SF ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{g
v j
2 , g
v j
3 } j :x j=1;
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{h
M j
(α
u
)
123 ·h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n] )
≡ ( {hv j2 } j∈[n]; {g
v j
2 , g
v j
3 } j :x j=1; {h
M j
(α
u
)
123 · h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P-SF i ’th sk
)
where v j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and u←R Z`′−1N , if x= (x1, . . . , xn) does not satisfy M. By the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, it is implied by
( {g
v j
3 } j :x j=1, {h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n] )≡ ( {g
v j
3 } j :x j=1; { h
M j
(
αˆ
u
)
3 ·h
r j v j
3 ,h
r j
3 } j∈[n] )
where v j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and u←R Z`′−1N . This follows from Lemma 1 and readily proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 42 (Gamei ,2 to Gamei ,3). There exists an adversaryB4 with Time(B4)≈Time(A) such that
|Advi ,2−Advi ,3| ≤AdvSD
HN
p2 7→p2 p3
B2
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 40 (Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1) except that we generate
the κ’s key (for M) as
skM := ( { hM j
(α
u
)
123 · h
M j
(
αˆ
0
)
3 ·h
r˜ j w
1 ·T
v j
j , h
r˜ j
1 ·T j , h
r˜ j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·T
u j
j } j∈[n] )
where αˆ and h3 are known to the simulator. uunionsq
Lemma 43 (GameQ+1 ≡GameFinal). AdvQ+1 =AdvFinal.
Proof. Sample w, w0, w1, v j ,u j as usual. Let h123 and h3 be random generators of HN and Hp3 . We sample
α˜, αˆ←R ZN and define hα123 := hα˜123/hαˆ3 . Observe that this does not change the distribution of α conditioned
on αˆ. Therefore we can alternatively simulate GameQ+1 as follows:
Setup. Choose a pairwise independent hash function H : GT → {0,1}λ and output
mpk := ( g1, g w1 , g w01 , g w11 , e(g1,hα˜123); H ).
This follows from the fact hat e(g1,hαˆ3 )= 1.
Key Queries. For each query M, sample u←R Z`′−1N and r j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
skM := ( { h
M j
(
α˜
u
)
123 ·h
r j w
1 ·h
r j v j
2 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 ·h
r j u j
2 } j∈[n] )
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Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1}, s, s j ←R ZN for all j ∈ [n] and output
ctx∗ :=
(
g s1 · g s23, { g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
sv j+s j u j
23 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
23 } j :x∗j =1, H(e(g
s
1 · g s23,hα˜123) · e(g s3,h−αˆ3 ) ) ·mb
)
.
Here we let g23 := g2 · g3.
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′, output 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that e(g s3,h
−αˆ
3 ) has Θ(p3)-bit leftover entropy conditioned on mpk and all skM. By the leftover
hash lemma, the last component of ctx∗ is uniformly distributed over {0,1}λ and the simulation is actually
identical GameFinal. This proves the lemma. uunionsq
D Missing Lemmas for Section 7.3
Fix an adversaryA that makes at most Q key queries, we useAdvxx to denote the advantage ofA inGamexx .
Lemma 44 (Game0 ≈c Game0′). There exists an adversaryB0 with Time(B0)≈Time(A) such that
|Adv0−Adv0′ | ≤AdvEXPLEMREVB0 (λ).
Proof. This follows from Lemma 12 (our new entropy expansion lemma). On input
aux : [A>1 ]1, [A
>
1 W]1, [A
>
1 W0]1, [A
>
1 W1]1
ct : [C0]1,
{
[C1, j ]1, [C2, j ]1
}
j∈[n]
sk :
{
[K0, j ]2, [K1, j ]2, [K2, j ]2
}
j∈[n]
 ,
algorithmB0 proceeds as follows:
Setup. Sample k←R Z2k+1p and output
mpk := ( aux, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ).
Key Queries. For each query M, sample K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p and d˜ j ←R Zk+1p for j ∈ [n], and output
skM :=
( {
[(k‖K′)M>j +K0, j d˜ j ]2, [K1, j d˜ j ]2, [K2, j d˜ j ]2
}
j∈[n]
)
.
Here we implicitly set d j :=D j d˜ j which is uniformly distributed over span(B).
Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1} and output
ctx∗ :=
(
[C0]1,
{
[C1, j ]1, [C2, j ]1
}
j :x∗j =1,e([C0]1, [k]2) ·mb
)
.
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′, output 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that when B0’s input is the left distribution in Lemma 12, the output is identical to Game0; and
when it is the right distribution in Lemma 12, the output is identical to Game0′ . This proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 45 (Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1). There exists an adversaryB2 with Time(B2)≈Time(A) such that
|Advi −Advi ,1| ≤Adv
MDDHnk,k+1
B2
(λ).
Proof. This follows from the MDDHnk,k+1 assumption asserting
( [B]2, {[d j ,i ←R span(B)]2} j∈[n] )≈c ( [B]2, {[d j ,i ←R Zk+1p ]2} j∈[n] ).
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On input [B]2, {[t j ]2} j∈[n], algorithm B2 samples A1,a2,a∥2 as required and picks W,W0,W1 ←R Z(2k+1)×(k+1)p ,
and prepares V(2)j ,U
(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2) and α←R Zp , and proceeds as follows.
Setup. Pick k←R Z2k+1p and output
mpk := ( [A>1 ]1, [A>1 W]1, [A>1 W0]1, [A>1 W1]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k]2) ).
Key Queries. For the κ’th secret key query M, pick K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p and output
skM :=

{ [(k+αa∥2‖K′)M>j + (W+V(2)j )d j ]2, [d j ]2 [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )d j ]2 } j∈[n] κ< i
{ [(k‖K′)M>j + (W+V(2)j )t j ]2, [t j ]2 [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )t j ]2 } j∈[n] κ= i
{ [(k‖K′)M>j + (W+V(2)j )d j ]2, [d j ]2 [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )d j ]2 } j∈[n] κ> i
where [d j ]2 ←R [span(B)]2 for all j ∈ [n].
Ciphertext. For challenge attribute vector x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗n ) and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1} and c,c j ←R span(A1,a2) for all j ∈ [n], and output
ctx∗ := ( [c>]1, { [c>(W+V(2)j )+c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )]1, [c>j ]1} j :x∗j =1, e([c
>]1, [k]2) ·mb ).
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′, output 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that when t j ←R span(B), the output is identical to that in Gamei ; and when t j ←R Zk+1p , the output
is identical to that in Gamei ,1. This proves the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 46 (Gamei ,1 ≡Gamei ,2). Advi ,1 =Advi ,2.
Proof. Fix bases A1,a2,a
∥
2,B, common parameters W,W0,W1,k,α, and all random coins except those for the
i ’th key. It is sufficient to prove that, for x does not satisfy M and all {d j ∉ span(B)} j∈[n], we have
(κ’th sk, κ 6= i︷ ︸︸ ︷
V(2)j B ;
E-normal ct︷ ︸︸ ︷
{V(2)j } j :x j=1;
P-normal i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(k‖K′)M>j +V(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]
)≡ (V(2)j B; {V(2)j } j :x j=1;
P-SF i ’th sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)M>j +V(2)j d j ,d j } j∈[n]
)
where K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p ,V
(2)
j ←R spank+1(a∥2).
Let b∥ be a (fixed) non-zero vector in Zk+1p satisfying B>b∥ = 0. It is direct to see that we can replace V(2)j
with V(2)j +a∥2v j b∥
>
where v j ←R Zp for all j ∈ [n] in both distributions without changing the distributions.
For all {V(2)j } j∈[n] after substitution, it is sufficient to show that
( { v j } j :x j=1, {(0a
∥
2‖K′)M>j +a∥2v j r j ,r j } j∈[n] )≡ ( { v j } j :x j=1, {( αa∥2 ‖K′)M>j +a∥2v j r j ,r j } j∈[n] )
where K′ ←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p , v j ←R Zp , and we let r j := d>j b∥. We note that r j 6= 0 since d j 6∈ span(B) for all
j ∈ [n]. This is implied by Lemma 1 and we readily prove the lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 47 (Gamei ,2 ≈c Gamei ,3). There exists an adversaryB3 with Time(B3)≈Time(A) such that
|Advi ,2−Advi ,3| ≤Adv
MDDHnk,k+1
B2
(λ).
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 45 (Gamei ≈c Gamei ,1) except that we generate
the κ’s key as
( { [(k+ αa∥2 ‖K′)M>j + (W+V(2)j )t j ]2, [t j ]2 [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )t j ]2 } j∈[n] )
where a∥2 and α are known to the simulator. uunionsq
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Lemma 48 (GameQ+1 ≡GameFinal). AdvQ+1 =AdvFinal.
Proof. Sample A1,a2,a
∥
2,B,W,W0,W1 and V
(2)
j ,U
(2)
j as usual. We sample k˜ ←R Z2k+1p , α←R Zp , and define
k := k˜−αa∥2. The joint distribution of ( k, k+αa∥2 = k˜ ) is the same as in GameQ+1 and we can simulate the
game as follows.
Setup. Output
mpk := ( [A>1 ]1, [A>1 W]1, [A>1 W0]1, [A>1 W1]1, e([A>1 ]1, [k˜]2) ).
The simulation is correct here because e([A>1 ]1, [k]2)= e([A>1 ]1, [k˜]2).
Key Queries. For each key query M, pick K′←R Z(2k+1)×(`
′−1)
p , d j ←R span(B) for j ∈ [n] and output
skM := ( { [(k˜‖K′)M>j + (W+V(2)j )d j ]2, [d j ]2 [(W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )d j ]2 } j∈[n] ).
Ciphertext. Upon receiving a challenge attribute vector x∗ and two equal-length messages m0,m1, pick
b ←R {0,1}, c,c j ←R span(A1,a2) for all j ∈ [n] and output
ctx∗ := ([c>]1, { [c>(W+V(2)j )+c>j (W0+ j ·W1+U(2)j )]1, [c>j ]1} j :x∗j =1, e([c
>]1, [k˜]2)/ e([c>]1, [αa∥2]2) ·mb ).
Guess. WhenA halts with output b′,B1 outputs 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
Observe that the boxed term is uniformly distributed over Zp with high probability conditioned on other
part of the simulation. Hence it does not change the distribution if we replace mb with a random message
m which leads to GameFinal. uunionsq
E Hybrid Argument for Entropy Expansion in Section 8.1
To prove the entropy expansion statement in (13) for our composite-order unbounded CP-ABE, we employ
the following hybrid argument:
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
s j w
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
sk : hr1 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j
1 } j∈[n]
 LHS in (13)
p1 7→p1p2p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1, {g
s j w
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
sk : h123
r
, { h123
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
, h123
r j
} j∈[n]

p1 7→p1p2≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g
s j w
1 , g
s j
1 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 } j∈[n]
sk : hr123, { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 , h
r j
123 } j∈[n]

Lemma 3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g
s j w
1 · g
s j w
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : hr13 · hr2 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r w+r j u j
2 , h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 } j∈[n]

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p1 7→p1p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g
s j w
1 · g
s j w
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : h1
r ·hr2 , { h1
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1) ·hr w+r j u j2 , h1
r j ·hr j2 } j∈[n]

(14)≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2, {g
s j w
1 · g
s j v j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : hr1 ·hr2 , { h
r w+r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · h
r v j
2 ·h
r j u j
2 , h
r j
1 ·h
r j
2 } j∈[n]
 RHS in (13)
F Hybrid Argument for Entropy Expansion in Section 9.2
To prove the entropy expansion statement in (18) for our unbounded KP-ABE for arithmetic span program,
we employ the following hybrid argument:
aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 , {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
sw ′+s′j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
1 , h
r j w
′
1 , h
r j
1 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , h
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 } j∈[n]

LHS in (18)
p1 7→p1 p2 p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 , {g
sw+s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
sw ′+s′j (w ′0+ j ·w ′1)
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : { h123
r j w
, h123
r j w
′
, h123
r j
, h123
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
, h123
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)} j∈[n]

p1 7→p1 p2≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 , g
s j
1 , g
sw ′
1 · g sw
′
2 · g
s′j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 , g
s′j
1 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
123 , h
r j w
′
123 , h
r j
123, h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
123 , h
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
123 } j∈[n]

(19)≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
sw ′
1 · g sw
′
2 · g
s′j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 · g
s′j u
′
j
2 , g
s′j
1 · g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : {h
r j w
13 · h
r j w
2 , h
r j w
′
13 · h
r j w
′
2 , h
r j
13 · h
r j
2 , h
r j (w0+ j ·w1)
13 · h
r j u j
2 , h
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
13 · h
r j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]

p1 7→p1 p3≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g sw1 · g sw2 · g
s j (w0+ j ·w1)
1 · g
s j u j
2 , g
s j
1 · g
s j
2 , g
sw ′
1 · g sw
′
2 · g
s′j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1)
1 · g
s′j u
′
j
2 , g
s′j
1 · g
s′j
2 } j∈[n]
sk : { h1
r j w ·hr j w2 , h1
r j w
′
·hr j w
′
2 , h1
r j ·hr j2 , h1
r j (w0+ j ·w1) ·hr j u j2 , h1
r j (w
′
0+ j ·w ′1) ·hr j u
′
j
2 } j∈[n]

(20)≈c

aux : g1, g w1 , g
w0
1 , g
w1
1 , g
w ′
1 , g
w ′0
1 , g
w ′1
1
ct : g s1 · g s2 , {g sw1 · g
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
RHS in (18)
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